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CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY AND TANGIBILITY
RACHEL BAYEFSKY*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court, in the 2016 case Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
announced a framework for determining whether a plaintiff had
alleged an injury that would permit entry into federal court. The
Court indicated that a plaintiff, in order to have constitutional
standing, needed to suffer harm that was “concrete” or “real.” In
explaining how courts could ascertain whether an alleged harm was
concrete, the Court created a category of “intangible” harm subject to
a distinctive, and arguably more demanding, concreteness inquiry
than “tangible” harm, a category that seemingly includes only
physical or economic harm. In particular, Spokeo directed courts to
inquire into whether an intangible harm bears a sufficiently close
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relationship to a historically recognized cause of action and into
whether such a harm has been elevated by congressional action to the
level of cognizability. Since Spokeo, federal courts have wrestled with
how to operationalize the Supreme Court’s statements on intangible
harm and standing. Beneath the growing body of doctrine lie funda-
mental questions about which values are at stake in categorizing
harm into tangible and intangible varieties; whether the advance-
ment of these values is justified; and whether, if so, this advancement
is best accomplished through the conceptual tools that federal courts
have applied to the task.
This Article investigates and challenges the principles underlying
the categorizations of harm outlined in Spokeo, particularly the
distinction between tangible and intangible harm. This Article ar-
gues that this distinction, and the Spokeo Court’s emphasis on the
“concreteness” of harm more broadly, reflect an effort to identify a set
of uncontroversially pressing human interests that would justify
access to judicial proceedings. These interests are often conceptual-
ized in terms of those commensurable with money, quantifiable, or
susceptible to evidentiary proof. Yet this approach invites courts to
make contestable normative judgments about essential human in-
terests in a way that risks undermining judicial legitimacy, and it
obscures the internal complexity and contextual specificity of physical
and economic harm. For example, economic loss, as well as pain and
suffering resulting from physical harm, are treated as intangible in
certain legal contexts, and the damage resulting from economic and
physical harm cannot always be readily proven or valued at a given
point in time. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on concreteness and its
invocation of tangibility, this Article contends, are not needed in
order to achieve a nuanced balance between competing features of
standing doctrine: concerns about the separation of powers and the
efficient administration of justice, on the one hand, and concerns
about access to the federal courts and judicial legitimacy, on the
other. Rather, courts should eschew concreteness as a factor in the
standing inquiry independently of whether harm is adequately par-
ticularized. Moreover, particularity can fruitfully be understood, in
statutory cases, in terms of whether the legal provision under which
a plaintiff is suing defines the scope of potential plaintiffs with
sufficient specificity. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into constitutional
standing doctrine, the 2016 case Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,1 left many
questions unresolved. Constitutional standing doctrine has long
required plaintiffs seeking to enter federal court to allege that they
have suffered an “injury in fact,” or a “concrete and particularized”
harm,2 that is “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the de-
fendant” and is “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial deci-
sion.”3 In Spokeo, the Court considered the circumstances under
which plaintiffs’ allegations of statutory violations could give rise to
injury in fact. The plaintiff in Spokeo, Thomas Robins, alleged that
defendant Spokeo, a consumer reporting agency, violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act by disseminating inaccurate information about
Robins—information that, however, may not have adversely affected
his credit standing.4 The Supreme Court held that Robins had to
show not only that he had suffered a “particularized” harm, but also
that this harm was “concrete” in the sense of “actual[ ]” or “real.”5
The Court did not decide whether Robins’s harm was concrete, but
rather remanded to the Ninth Circuit to make that determination.6
The Court also did not settle the more general issue of which kinds
of harms plaintiffs need to allege in order to show that they have
suffered a “concrete” injury stemming from a statutory violation.
The narrowness of Spokeo’s holding should not obscure the fact
that Spokeo announced a framework for evaluating standing claims
that, though building on prior case law, placed emphasis on a dis-
tinctive set of categories. In particular, the Supreme Court in
Spokeo distinguished between tangible and intangible harm.7
Though the Court indicated that intangible harm could be concrete,
the Court also applied a specific inquiry to guide the determination
1. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
2. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
3. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
4. See id. at 1545-46.
5. Id. at 1548.
6. Id. at 1550.
7. See id. at 1549.
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of whether a given intangible harm was cognizable.8 This inquiry
involved, the Court stated, consideration of whether the plaintiff ’s
alleged harm bore a sufficiently close relationship to a historically
recognized cause of action and of whether Congress had “elevat[ed]”
the harm to the level of cognizable injury.9 More broadly, the Spokeo
Court focused on concreteness as a requirement for cognizable in-
jury, independent of whether harm was particularized, in a more
direct and explicit way than ever before.10
In the wake of Spokeo, federal courts have wrestled with how to
operationalize the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the cogniza-
bility of intangible harm. Courts have come to an array of conclu-
sions regarding the cognizability of harms ranging from inadequate
protection of personal information,11 to the receipt of unsolicited
phone calls and text messages,12 to the violation of state procedural
rules for debt collection.13 The Ninth Circuit’s August 2017 decision
on remand in Spokeo typifies courts’ efforts to provide further struc-
ture to the standing inquiry in cases of intangible harm. According
to the Ninth Circuit, drawing on a previous Second Circuit case,
In evaluating Robins’s claim of harm, we thus ask: (1) whether
the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect his
concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights), and
if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this
case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such
interests.14
Applying this inquiry, the Ninth Circuit decided that Robins’s
alleged harm of having inaccurate information disseminated about
him was, in fact, concrete.15 The Supreme Court has permitted this
8. See id.
9. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir.
2017).
12. See Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017).
13. See Lyshe v. Levy, 854 F.3d 855, 856 (6th Cir. 2017).
14. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017) (drawing on the Second
Circuit’s formulation in Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2016)), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 931 (2018).
15. See id. at 1117.
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decision to stand, denying certiorari in a renewed appeal by Spokeo
on January 22, 2018.16
The concepts of “intangible” harm and “concrete” interests are
now part of the standing landscape, helping to play the role of gate-
keeper to the federal courts. In evaluating the coherence and plausi-
bility of contemporary standing doctrine, it is instructive to examine
the function that these concepts serve and the aims advanced by
their inclusion in the standing analysis. This Article investigates
the principles underlying the distinction between tangible and
intangible harm, as well as the relationship between these catego-
ries and “concreteness.” Even critics of the Court’s constitutional
standing jurisprudence tend either not to focus on tangibil-
ity—which, after all, assumed particular prominence only recently
in Spokeo—or to take for granted the distinction between tangible
and intangible harm.17 This Article argues, by contrast, that the line
16. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018) (mem.).
17. For examples of critiques of standing doctrine that predated the invocation of
tangibility in Spokeo and mention tangibility not at all or in passing, see Heather Elliott, The
Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 463 (2008); William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 230-31 (1988); and Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 188-89 (1992). For
examples of discussions of standing that mention tangibility without problematizing the
distinction between tangible and intangible harm, see Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform
Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 179 (2017) (“Plaintiffs asserting intangible harms often
have difficulty establishing the requisite injury.”); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in
Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 313 (2008) (“[I]n public rights cases ... the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is material and tangible.”); Margot E. Kaminski,
Standing After Snowden: Lessons on Privacy Harm from National Security Surveillance
Litigation, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 415 (2017) (“Courts are almost uniquely disinclined to
recognize intangible harms in the area of privacy law.”); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing
Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1667 (2007) (“Why should inchoate injuries be less
justiciable than tangible ones?”); Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible
Injury in Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 753 (2016) (arguing that the
Supreme Court regularly adjudicates cases involving injuries to “intangible” informational
interests); Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and
Relevance Today, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 385 (2017) (“Spokeo permits named plaintiffs to
collectively pursue claims under federal statutes—including civil rights—when they suffer
intangible harms, so long as those harms are concrete.”); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats
Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 773 (2018)
(“[T]here is a robust basis in the law to recognize the intangible nature of data-breach
harms.”); and Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Misspeaks, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 106-07). Rare references to the nature of the distinction between tangible and
intangible harm appear in the work of Gene R. Nichol and Felix T. Wu. Nichol has stated that
“[i]f the lines between the tangible and the intangible often turn in circles, we may be
expecting too much from them.” Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of
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between tangible and intangible harm is not a deep-seated or clear-
cut feature of empirical reality, but a contextually sensitive
boundary that reflects normative principles about which kinds of
harm should count for standing purposes. 
More specifically, “tangible” harm in the constitutional standing
context is frequently understood by courts and commentators to
refer to physical or economic harm,18 as distinct from everything
else, including being hindered in the exercise of religion,19 suffering
“aesthetic” harm when the environment is damaged,20 or undergoing
a violation of privacy.21 Yet certain economic interests, such as
securities, intellectual property rights, and contract rights, are
described as intangible in a variety of legal settings, and economic
loss is viewed as intangible in the contexts of property insurance
and negligence law.22 Additionally, the pain and suffering arising
Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 338 (2002). Wu, in critiquing Spokeo’s effects on standing
law with particular reference to the context of privacy violations and highlighting difficulties
with “a free-standing concreteness requirement,” has indicated that the Court’s “shift” in
Spokeo “is in turning to an inquiry in which the issue of tangibility even arises in the first
place.” Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 439, 452
(2017). This Article, while drawing from insights in the literature, engages in a more in-depth
inquiry into the nature and implications of the distinction between tangible and intangible
harm, as well as into Spokeo’s treatment of concreteness as an independent feature of the
standing analysis. 
18. See, e.g., Craig Konnoth & Seth Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 47, 52 (2016) (“[T]angible injuries apparently embrace what Justice Scalia referred
to as ‘Wallet Injury’ to the value of economic interests, including intellectual property rights,
along with physical interference.” (footnote omitted)); Solove & Citron, supra note 17, at 755
(“Data-breach harms ... are not tangible like broken limbs and destroyed property.”); see also
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 642 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“In the case of economic or physical harms, of course, the ‘injury in fact’ question is straight-
forward.... [I]ntangible harms must be evaluated case by case.”); Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874
F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2017) (referring to “tangible, economic harm”); Church v. Accretive
Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 995 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (referring to “tangible econ-
omic or physical harm that courts often expect”).
19. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (citing a free exercise case,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), as an example
of a case in which harm was intangible and yet still concrete). 
20. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 75 (1984)
(“The Court, in giving standing to environmental claims, relied on injuries that were not only
intangible, but also subjective in the sense that they necessarily depended upon the psycho-
logical makeup of the plaintiff.”). 
21. See, e.g., In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639-40
(3d Cir. 2017) (referring to the unauthorized dissemination of personal information as an
“intangible harm”).
22. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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from physical damage, which represents a key component of the
injury involved in inflicting physical harm, is often considered in-
tangible.23
The categorization of economic and physical harm as tangible in
the standing context does not, therefore, follow inevitably from the
nature of tangibility. Rather, this Article contends, the distinction
between tangible and intangible harm reflects an effort to identify
a set of uncontroversially legitimate human interests that would
justify courts in reordering the status quo. These interests are often
conceptualized in terms of those commensurable with money, quan-
tifiable, or susceptible to evidentiary proof. Yet this approach re-
sults in a highly contestable portrayal of essential human interests
and detracts from the legitimacy of judicial decisions about cogni-
zability. Spokeo’s invocation of tangibility and its emphasis on
concreteness more broadly—this Article argues—are not needed in
order to achieve an appropriate balance between concerns about the
separation of powers and the efficient administration of justice, on
the one hand, and concerns about access to the federal courts and
judicial legitimacy, on the other. Instead, courts should move away
from treating concreteness as a factor in constitutional standing
doctrine independent of whether harm is adequately particularized.
Moreover, courts can fruitfully understand particularity in statutory
cases in terms of whether the legal provision under which a plaintiff
is suing defines the scope of potential plaintiffs with sufficient
specificity.
The analysis here has both doctrinal and theoretical implications.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, as some commentators
have noted, suggests that tangibility is “a sufficient but not a neces-
sary condition” for concreteness24 or that “[t]angible injuries ... more
easily pass the concreteness test than intangible injuries.”25 As a
doctrinal matter, this Article argues against an entrenchment of the
distinction between tangible and intangible harm as the law de-
velops. It also challenges the Supreme Court’s insistence on con-
creteness as a requirement for injury in fact independently of
particularity. As a theoretical matter, this Article extends the
23. See infra Part II.B.2.
24. Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 18, at 51-52; see also id. at 62. 
25. Gregory R. Manring, Note, It’s Time for an Intervention!: Resolving the Conflict
Between Rule 24(a)(2) and Article III Standing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525, 2535 (2017).
2018] CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY AND TANGIBILITY 2293
critique that injury in fact is a normative criterion, not a factual
one;26 the same is true, the Article argues, of the categorization of
harm as tangible or intangible for the purposes of undertaking the
injury-in-fact inquiry. Further, this Article counters the tendency to
treat economic and physical harm as firmly established and similar
in nature across different contexts, and it questions the value of cri-
teria such as commensurability with money, quantifiability, and
susceptibility to evidentiary proof as metrics in evaluating cogniz-
ability. These criteria are not needed, the Article suggests, in order
to promote fit between standing doctrine and the underlying values
that this doctrine furthers.
While drawing on insights from the extensive scholarly literature
critiquing the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine,27 this Article fo-
cuses on a concept that has been the subject of little critical scru-
tiny—the idea of tangibility invoked in Spokeo—and considers the
development of standing jurisprudence following the recent Spokeo
decision.28 This Article also highlights the less “solid” dimensions of
26. See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 231; Nichol, supra note 17, at 304-05; Sunstein, supra
note 17, at 188-89. 
27. See sources cited supra note 17; see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmenta-
tion of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1070-71 (2015); Hessick, supra note 17, at 277; Nichol,
supra note 17, at 305.
28. For other articles that have addressed the landscape of standing post-Spokeo, see, for
example, William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197; Henry
E. Hudson, Christopher M. Keegan & P. Thomas DiStanislao, III, Standing in a Post-Spokeo
Environment, 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 11 (2017); Kaminski, supra note 17; Konnoth & Kreimer,
supra note 18; Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will
the Supreme Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1353-63
(2017); Michael T. Morley, Spokeo: The Quasi-Hohfeldian Plaintiff and the Non-Federal
Federal Question, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemo-
cratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845, 892-97 (2017); Solove & Citron, supra note 17; Willis,
supra note 17; Wu, supra note 17; William S.C. Goldstein, Note, Standing, Legal Injury
Without Harm, and the Public/Private Divide, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1571 (2017); Joshua Scott
Olin, Note, Rethinking Article III Standing in Class Action Consumer Protection Cases Fol-
lowing Spokeo v. Robins, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 69 (2017); Leading Cases, Justiciability—
Class Action Standing—Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 130 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2016); and Recent
Cases, Standing—Class Actions—Ninth Circuit Allows Fair Credit Reporting Act Class Action
to Proceed Past Standing Challenge.—Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2017),
131 HARV. L. REV. 894 (2018). A previous article I wrote examined psychological harm as a
basis for constitutional injury in fact, reviewed various “intangible” injuries cognized by
courts, and endorsed a “particularity inquiry” as part of a test for analyzing the cognizability
of psychological harm. See Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing,
81 BROOK. L. REV. 1555 (2016). That article, however, did not critically interrogate the
distinction between tangible and intangible harm, evaluate courts’ post-Spokeo understanding
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apparently tangible economic and physical harm, rather than fo-
cusing solely on the reality of intangible harm. Further, this Article
identifies and challenges the role of certain characteristics—com-
mensurability with money, quantifiability, and susceptibility to
evidentiary proof—in constitutional standing doctrine. The aim is
thus to unsettle intuitions about recently invoked categories in the
Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence—tangibility and concrete-
ness—while exploring the principles affecting these doctrinal moves.
This Article has the following structure. Part I illuminates the
conceptual basis of the courts’ turn to concreteness and tangibility
in constitutional standing doctrine. It notes that clear understand-
ings of these concepts are absent from the case law, and it identifies
principles, related to the separation of powers and the conservation
of judicial resources, that underlie the emergence of concreteness as
a standalone requirement for injury in fact. This Part then high-
lights Spokeo’s application of a distinctive inquiry to intangible as
distinct from tangible harm. It argues, drawing on cases from fed-
eral appellate and district courts following Spokeo, that the inquiry
into whether intangible harm is concrete presents a challenge for
the legitimacy of judicial standing determinations.
Given that tangibility now plays a role in standing doctrine, Part
II focuses on the meaning and function of this concept. Part II
critically interrogates the distinction between tangible and intangi-
ble harm, as well as the relevance of this distinction to the aims of
standing doctrine. The categorization of harm as tangible or intan-
gible in the standing context, this Part indicates, represents a
normatively imbued effort to identify uncontroversially legitimate
human interests that would justify judicial intervention. In making
the tangible/intangible distinction, however, standing doctrine fails
to reflect the complex and contextual nature of physical and econ-
omic harm, and it places undue emphasis on concepts, such as com-
mensurability with money, quantifiability, and susceptibility to
evidentiary proof, that are ill-suited for a role in the constitutional
standing analyis.
Part III lays out implications of the foregoing analysis of tangibil-
ity and concreteness for standing doctrine. This Part argues that
courts assessing injury in fact can strike an appropriate balance
of “concreteness,” or challenge concreteness as a basis for injury in fact.
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between concerns about the separation of powers and resource
constraints, on the one hand, and access to judicial redress in the
federal courts, on the other, by inquiring into whether harm is par-
ticularized but not into whether harm is independently concrete.
The Part then highlights advantages and drawbacks of different
conceptions of particularity. It contends that particularity can
plausibly be understood in statutory cases in terms of whether the
statutory provision under which a plaintiff is suing defines the scope
of potential plaintiffs with sufficient specificity.
In sum, the Article examines concepts underlying constitutional
standing doctrine in its current form and argues that the federal
courts should veer away from the treatment of concreteness and
tangibility found in Spokeo.
I. CONCRETENESS AND TANGIBILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
DOCTRINE
A. Concreteness as a Prerequisite for Injury in Fact
Constitutional standing doctrine raises the question of which
kinds of cases are suited for adjudication in the federal courts—and
which kinds of litigants are equipped to participate in these cases.
As a doctrinal matter, constitutional standing doctrine has been
rooted in Article III’s limitation of the federal judicial power to
“[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.”29 Courts’ interpretations of this lim-
itation have shifted over time. In the first half of the twentieth
century, courts required private plaintiffs to have a “legal right” to
sue, “one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers
a privilege.”30 The “legal right” approach fell out of favor with the
advent of “injury in fact” as the metric of a plaintiff ’s individualized
interest in a lawsuit for standing purposes. The Supreme Court, in
the 1970 case Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
v. Camp (ADAPSO), stated that the standing question raised the
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For discussions of the history of modern standing doc-
trine, see, for example, Fallon, supra note 27, at 1064-68; Hessick, supra note 17, at 290-99;
Sunstein, supra note 17, at 168-97; and Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat
Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004). 
30. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
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issue not of whether a plaintiff had a “legal interest,” but “whether
the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him in-
jury in fact, economic or otherwise.”31 The standard articulation of
the injury-in-fact requirement is now that “a plaintiff must show
that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’
that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.’”32
The injury-in-fact requirement may have initially served to lib-
eralize the law of standing by permitting plaintiffs to allege that a
particular course of conduct had injured them “in fact” even if they
could not show that they possessed an individual legal right in-
fringed by the challenged conduct.33 But the injury-in-fact require-
ment began, in the 1970s, to be interpreted more restrictively.34
Judicial concerns about the separation of powers spurred this de-
velopment in significant part.35 The injury requirement, courts indi-
cated, restricted courts to their constitutional role of adjudicating
disputes among individuals—preventing courts from generally
policing the legality of executive and legislative action, and barring
private individuals from inappropriately exercising the executive
branch’s enforcement role.36 Remedial concerns also seem to have
factored into courts’ interpretations of the injury requirement; for
example, courts may be reluctant to determine that a plaintiff has
standing to seek an injunction that is perceived as intrusive.37 In
31. 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
32. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
33. See Hessick, supra note 17, at 289-90.
34. See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1066 & n.19; Hessick, supra note 17, at 289-90; Nichol,
supra note 20, at 74-75. 
35. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Hessick, supra note 17, at 289-90;
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890-93 (1983); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 194-95.
36. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-61; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975); Elliott,
supra note 17, at 462-63; F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing,
95 N.C. L. REV. 673, 684-85 (2017). Further, Tara Grove has argued that the injury-in-fact
requirement could prevent the executive branch from impermissibly delegating enforcement
discretion to private plaintiffs. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation
Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 808 (2009). For further discussion of separation-of-powers
rationales for standing doctrine, see infra Part III. 
37. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (invoking reasons grounded in the separation of powers
not to “recogniz[e] standing in a case brought ... to seek a restructuring of the apparatus
established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties” via injunctive relief). As Richard
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addition, courts have cited “the scarce resources of the federal
courts” to justify standing doctrine.38 One way to understand this
point is that the federal courts’ resources should be devoted to those
cases in which the need for judicial intervention is clearest because
plaintiffs have suffered a genuine injury.39
Arguments in favor of injury in fact, especially those based on the
proper role of the branches of government, frequently suggest a
concern with “particularity,” or attention to whether a plaintiff ’s
alleged injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way”40 and is distinct from one “shared with ‘all members of the
public.’”41 One rationale for the particularity requirement is that
harms affecting a wide swath of the population would be better
addressed by the legislative and executive branches, which respond
to majoritarian concerns, than by the judiciary, which ought to
concern itself with individual rights.42 The focus on particularity
also dovetails with remedial issues; the specter of tasking the courts
with providing redress on a theoretically unlimited scale, and per-
mitting courts to interfere too much with the workings of other
Fallon has pointed out, the Supreme Court has alluded to “concerns about the peculiar
intrusiveness of injunctive remedies” in ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek an
injunction. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 650 (2006) [hereinafter Fallon,
Justiciability and Remedies]; see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983). For
additional analysis of the relationship between standing and courts’ concerns about overly
intrusive remedies, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1984) [hereinafter
Fallon, Public Law Litigation]; and Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts:
Triple Error Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127, 166-67 (2014).
38. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
191 (2000); Jackson v. Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health, 399 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
39. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 191 (“Standing doctrine functions to ensure ... that the scarce
resources of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a
concrete stake.”).
40. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992).
41. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Lévitt, 302
U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)).
42. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 489; Scalia, supra note 35, at 894; see also Richardson,
418 U.S. at 179 (noting that the plaintiff could seek redress through the “traditional electoral
process”). But see FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a political forum may
be more readily available where an injury is widely shared ... does not, by itself, automatically
disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.”). 
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branches of government, looms large over debates about the restrict-
iveness of standing requirements.43
In addition to invoking particularity as a feature of cognizable
injury, courts have sometimes referred to “concreteness.” Courts
originally invoked “concreteness” as part of a justification for stand-
ing doctrine especially prevalent before the advent of injury in fact:
“concrete adverseness” between parties to a lawsuit “sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends.”44 In
order for such adverseness to exist, plaintiffs had to “allege[ ] ... a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.”45 But once “injury
in fact” became a standing requirement, injury itself—as distinct
from the controversy between the parties—had to be “concrete.”46 
Prior to Spokeo, concreteness was not generally treated as a
requirement for standing independent of particularity. The Supreme
Court frequently used the phrase “concrete and particularized,”47
but often without explicitly identifying the contribution of concrete-
ness separate from that of particularity.48 In fact, the Court has
described the concreteness requirement in a manner closely related
to particularity: “Concrete injury ... adds the essential dimension of
specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party
have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as
unlawful.”49 The Court suggested in the 1998 case FEC v. Akins, in
which the plaintiffs alleged that they had been deprived of informa-
43. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984); see also Fallon, Justiciability and Reme-
dies, supra note 37, at 649-51.
44. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see Wu, supra note 17, at 454-55 (“In this
context, concreteness refers to the nature of the case as a whole, rather than the nature of the
alleged harm.”).
45. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
46. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974)
(“Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute
which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.”); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 n.16 (1972) (noting Alexis de Tocqueville’s “observation that
judicial review is effective largely because it is ... exercised only to remedy a particular,
concrete injury” (citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102 (1945))).
47. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014); Massa-
chusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177.
48. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1555 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[T]ime and again, our decisions have coupled the words ‘concrete and particularized.’... True,
but true too ... many ... opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms ‘concrete’ and
‘particularized.’”).
49. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220-21.
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tion relevant to voting, that an injury could be cognizable even if not
“widely shared,” provided that the injury was “sufficiently con-
crete.”50 The Court’s examples of such injuries were mass torts and
broad interference with voting rights.51 If particularity means that
the harm is not widely shared,52 then these pronouncements imply
that concreteness is distinct from particularity and is at least a
sufficient condition for cognizability. But this does not mean that
concreteness is an independently necessary condition for cognizabil-
ity.53
Spokeo, however, explicitly took the position that concreteness
was a requirement for injury in fact independent of particularity.54
In this case, the Court confronted a putative class action suit by
Thomas Robins, who alleged that Spokeo had violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in disseminating false information
about Robins.55 For example, Robins claimed, Spokeo had failed to
heed the FCRA’s mandate that consumer reporting agencies “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of ”
reports on consumers.56 Robins sued pursuant to a provision of the
FCRA indicating that “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply
with any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any [individual] is
liable to that [individual]” for damages.57 The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that Robins had standing to sue, noting that Robins’s claim
was adequately particularized; the alleged misuse of Robins’s own
information was at stake.58 Spokeo argued, however, that the al-
legedly false information disseminated about Robins—for instance,
that he was married, had a job, and was relatively affluent59—did
50. 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
51. Id.
52. But see infra Part III.C for a discussion of possible meanings of particularity.
53. I thank Vicki Jackson for raising this point.
54. See Hudson, Keegan & DiStanislao, supra note 28, at 17 (stating that in Spokeo, the
Court “[s]eparat[ed] [the concreteness and particularity] requirements into two different
analyses for the first time”); Wu, supra note 17, at 455 (noting that before Spokeo, “[c]on-
creteness ha[d] not been thought to require an assessment of the nature and value of effects
directed at the plaintiff ”). 
55. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
56. Id. at 1545 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012)).
57. Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)). 
58. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413-14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded,
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
59. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546. 
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not inflict on Robins any “concrete harm.”60 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether Robins had alleged a cognizable
injury in fact as a consequence of the claimed statutory violation.61
Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion did not ultimately answer
this question, but the opinion identified core principles to apply to
the question’s resolution. Most significantly, the Court insisted that
injury in fact, in addition to being “particularized” in the sense of
“affect[ing] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,” must also
be “concrete.”62 The Court defined “concrete” as “‘de facto’; that is, it
must actually exist,” noting that “[w]hen we have used the adjective
‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—
‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”63 The Court’s definition of “concrete,”
though reasonably prompting the question of how much content it
added to the term, was the most explicit one to appear in the Su-
preme Court’s case law.64 The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit
to inquire into whether Robins’s harm, even if particularized, was
also concrete.65 
Though this Article later argues that concreteness should not be
conceived as an independent requirement for standing,66 it is worth
elucidating the basis for, and effects of, the contrary position. In
particular, an independent concreteness requirement might be
thought to respond to concerns about the separation of powers and
judicial resources underlying the injury-in-fact principle. 
60. Brief for Petitioner at 52, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339).
61. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546; see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015)
(mem.).
62. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1
(1992)).
63. Id. (first quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009); and then quoting
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (1971); and RANDOM HOUSE DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 305 (1967)).
64. Prior to Spokeo, the Court had distinguished “concrete” from “abstract” injury, see
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.13 (1974), and had
placed “concrete” alongside other adjectival descriptions of harm, such as “specific,” “demon-
strable,” “de facto,” “actual,” and “tangible,” see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661
(2013); Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 730 (2013); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-
25 (1998); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992); Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982); see also Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J.
1191, 1194-95 (2014) (listing several such adjectives).
65. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.
66. See infra Part III.B.
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The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to impose restric-
tions on Congress’s ability to grant plaintiffs the right to sue to
redress statutory violations.67 But if particularity were satisfied
whenever Congress authorized plaintiffs to sue to redress violations
of their own rights, and concreteness provided no independent
check, then constitutional limitations on standing might constrain
Congress to a limited degree. Further, if Congress could authorize
plaintiffs to sue simply because their own rights were violated,
without any resulting “actual” harm, then those bringing suit might
lack a “personal stake”68 in the outcome of the suit. Moreover, law-
suits based on violations of apparently “technical” statutory re-
quirements might flood the courts with trivial cases and reduce the
resources available to those who have been more grievously
harmed.69 The concreteness condition can thus be understood as a
response to concerns about the separation of powers, judicial admin-
istration, and the breadth of available remedies. But how are courts
to decide whether the concreteness requirement is satisfied?
B. Who Decides? Judicial Legitimacy and Concreteness in Spokeo
Spokeo’s response to the question of how harm could be deemed
concrete proceeded as follows. The Supreme Court, after defining
“concrete” injury as one that “must actually exist,” clarified that
“‘[c]oncrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’
Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have
confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can
nevertheless be concrete.”70 To support this proposition, Spokeo cited
two cases in which the Court had, without raising any standing
difficulty, adjudicated plaintiffs’ claims of free speech and free ex-
ercise violations, respectively.71 The Court then focused on how
“intangible” harms could be considered concrete, describing two
factors bearing on the concreteness of intangible harm: “history and
67. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577; see also Sunstein, supra note 17, at 200-02. 
68. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
69. See Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 24).
70. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548-49 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 406
(2009); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
71. Id. at 1549 (citing Summum, 555 U.S. 460; Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520).
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the judgment of Congress.”72 The historical inquiry, according to the
Court, was “whether an alleged intangible harm has a close rela-
tionship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing
a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”73 The “judg-
ment” of Congress, the Court continued, “is also instructive and im-
portant” because “Congress is well positioned to identify intangible
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements.”74
Spokeo’s reference to Congress’s role in defining cognizable injury
raises the question of whether congressional action suffices to create
injury in fact.75 The Court answered, in effect: not always. Specifi-
cally, “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms
does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-
fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory
right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that
right.”76 A “concrete injury” is still required.77 As a consequence, the
Court indicated, “Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III
by alleging a bare procedural violation,” that is, a violation of the
procedures for handling personal information mandated by the
FCRA.78 Nevertheless, the Court stated, “in some circumstances,” a
plaintiff alleging “the violation of a procedural right granted by
statute ... need not allege any additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified.”79 The Court explained the possibility of
cognizable injury in these circumstances by noting both that “the
risk of real harm” could “satisfy the requirement of concreteness”80
and that “the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort vic-
tims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”81 The
Court’s examples of such suits were libel and slander per se.82
72. Id. 
73. Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775-
77 (2000)).
74. Id. 
75. For a discussion of the relationship between statutory causes of action and injury in
fact in Spokeo, see Baude, supra note 28, at 213-16.
76. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1550.
79. Id. at 1549.
80. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)).
81. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 569-570 (1938)).
82. Id.
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The Court did not provide much guidance on how to distinguish
procedural violations that caused concrete harm from procedural
violations that did not. Instead, the Court gave an example of a
procedural violation that would not count for standing because it did
not “cause harm or present any material risk of harm”: the dissemi-
nation of an incorrect zip code by a consumer reporting agency.83
The Court then remanded to the Ninth Circuit to conduct the
concreteness inquiry in Robins’s case.84
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the Spokeo Court’s opinion,
providing a theory of standing according to which suits by “private
plaintiffs who assert[ ] claims vindicating public rights” involve a
more rigorous concreteness inquiry than “suits from private plain-
tiffs who allege[ ] a violation of their own rights.”85 Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, dissented,
arguing that Robins’s allegation that he had suffered “actual harm”
to his “employment prospects” rendered Robins’s injury sufficiently
concrete.86
Spokeo left to federal appellate and district courts the task of
filling in the details of the concreteness inquiry, perhaps partially
out of an interest among the Justices (down to eight after the death
of Justice Antonin Scalia) in reaching a compromise about the rela-
tionship between Article III standing and statutory violations.87
Nevertheless, the Court’s identification of factors significant to the
concreteness inquiry, and its references to intangible harm, high-
light underlying concerns about the grounds for judicial injury-in-
fact determinations. This point can be illuminated by considering
possible responses to the institutional question “who decides
whether harm is concrete?”88 
83. Id. at 1550.
84. Id.
85. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 1552.
86. Id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Appendix at 14, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct.
1540 (No. 13-1339)).
87. See Smith, supra note 28, at 894 (“In many respects, Spokeo is a narrow opinion with
hallmarks of a compromise.”).
88. See Hessick, supra note 36, at 675 (“[S]tanding protects the legitimacy of the federal
courts by allowing them to act only when necessary to protect rights.”); Daniel Townsend, Who
Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 76 (2015) (arguing
that Congress should define injuries for Article III standing purposes).
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The Supreme Court has not accepted the “subjective” response
that harm is concrete if the sufferer thinks the harm is real, pre-
sumably because doing so would severely diminish the constraining
force of the injury-in-fact requirement.89 The Court has also not en-
tirely delegated the decision about whether harm is real to the legal
actor that created the cause of action. In particular, the fact that
Congress has labeled certain conduct a legal violation does not mean
that those subject to this conduct necessarily suffer injury in fact.
The Spokeo Court, to be sure, took a somewhat equivocal position
on the relationship between legal violations and injury in fact.90
Spokeo did not rule out the possibility that some plaintiff claiming
that statutorily mandated procedures had been violated could,
without more, allege cognizable harm.91 This suggests that the legal
injury involved in the violation of a legal right—classically known
as “injuria”—could give rise to standing even without the “factual
injury,” or “damnum,” resulting from the legal violation.92
Yet the overall thrust of Spokeo is to require plaintiffs to show
factual harm over and above a legal violation. Spokeo emphasized
that plaintiff Robins could not “satisfy the demands of Article III by
alleging a bare procedural violation,” divorced from any concrete
harm.93 The idea seems to be that some kinds of legal violations
constitute, or imply the existence of, factual harm; other legal viola-
tions do not, but regardless, there must be a factual harm. Concrete-
ness, then, is not defined purely with reference to the lawmaking
powers of an institution outside the courts. Rather, the federal
courts have assigned to themselves the last word on whether harm
is concrete. The question is then on what basis courts can decide
which harms are real, and which are not, for the purposes of exer-
cising judicial authority. The Spokeo Court’s invocation of “tangible”
89. As now-Judge William Fletcher noted, the notion of injury “in fact,” if applied literally,
would support such an understanding of cognizable injury. See Fletcher, supra note 17, at
231-32. 
90. For discussion of the tension in Spokeo’s statements about injury in fact and statutory
rights, see Baude, supra note 28, at 214-16.
91. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (majority opinion).
92. For discussions of this distinction, see Hessick, supra note 17, at 280-81; see also
Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 18, at 57 (distinguishing between “threshold” injuries, such
as a violation of certain procedures mandated by statute, and “consequent” harms that result
from the violation of such procedures).
93. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550; see also Baude, supra note 28, at 223-27.
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and “intangible” harm is part of its response to this question. The
next Section therefore examines the place of tangibility in constitu-
tional standing doctrine.
C. The Role of Tangibility in Standing Doctrine
The Court invoked tangibility in the standing context infre-
quently for the first few decades after modern standing doctrine
emerged. An early instance was in 1975, when the Court stated that
a plaintiff “seek[ing] to challenge exclusionary zoning practices
must allege ... that he personally would benefit in a tangible way
from the court’s intervention.”94 “In a tangible way” distinguished
the kind of judicial action that could give plaintiffs access to af-
fordable housing from a declaration of the plaintiffs’ legal rights
that could not result in an altered living situation.95 “Tangible” in
this sense seems to have meant something like “actually,” although
it could also have referred more specifically to an improvement in
the plaintiff ’s material conditions.
More generally, “tangible” in the Supreme Court’s usage has
sometimes referred to a type of harm, but sometimes to the exis-
tence or reality of harm. As an example of “tangible” as a type of
harm, the Court differentiated, in a suit brought under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, between “plaintiffs seeking to enforce
these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are
‘noneconomic’ and probably noncompensable, and persons ... who
assert that they have suffered tangible economic injuries because of
statutory violations.”96 Here, “tangible” appears to refer to certain
kinds of injuries, that is, economic ones. But in the influential 1992
standing case, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court used
“tangibly” more along the lines of “actually” or “in reality,” stating:
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
94. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). 
95. See id.
96. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
The Court also referred, in a case about standing to sue under the Clayton Antitrust Act, to
“tangible economic injury.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 475 n.11 (1982).
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seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III
case or controversy.97
“Tangibly” here seems to denote the reality of the benefit.98 The
Court appeared to use “tangible,” in a related sense, to characterize
the reality of harm in Hollingsworth v. Perry.99 There, the Supreme
Court held that proponents of a California ballot initiative that
would amend the California Constitution to prohibit same-sex mar-
riage lacked standing to appeal a court decision holding that the
initiative violated the Federal Constitution.100 The Perry Court indi-
cated that “for a federal court to have authority under the Constitu-
tion to settle a dispute, the party before it must seek a remedy for
a personal and tangible harm.”101
The possibility of using “tangible” to refer to either the type of
harm or the reality of harm has implications for the relationship
between tangibility and concreteness, a relationship brought to the
fore in Spokeo. The Court’s insistence in Perry on “personal and
tangible harm” suggests that cognizable injury—“concrete and par-
ticularized injury”102—must be tangible, and prior to Spokeo, many
commentators took this view.103 Yet the Court had previously been
97. 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992); see also Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per
curiam) (same). 
98. The Court has also referred to “tangible legal rights” in a way that suggests an associ-
ation between “tangible” and “actual,” though perhaps also between tangibility and economic-
ally valuable interests. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 619 (1989) (stating that a
decision by the Arizona Supreme Court invalidating mineral leases “alter[ed] tangible legal
rights”); see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120-21 (2003) (referring to a judgment
preventing the prosecution of an individual for trespass as one that “alter[ed] tangible legal
rights” (quoting ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 619)).
99. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2661.
102. Id. at 2659.
103. See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 17, at 313 (“[I]n public rights cases[,] the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the injury is material and tangible.”); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason
Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 173 (2012) (“An
injury-in-fact, according to the Court, is something more fundamental than a legal right. It
is a ‘real-world,’ tangible harm.”); William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win:
Misconstruing Standing and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 238, 240
(indicating, as part of highlighting inconsistencies in standing jurisprudence, that “[i]f there
is no tangible effect, then presumably no individual would suffer concrete harm”); Nichol,
supra note 20, at 75 (“Article III now requires ‘distinct’ and ‘palpable’ injury. No judicial defin-
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willing to adjudicate cases involving harm that is often considered
intangible, such as injury arising from the display of a religious
monument or aesthetic harm resulting from environmental dam-
age.104
The Court’s approach toward cognizing intangible harm might
simply be cast as an inconsistency.105 In fact, the Third Circuit
stated after Spokeo that the notion of concrete intangible injury
created an “obvious linguistic contradiction.”106 But another possi-
bility is that “tangible” can be used in different ways: to denote the
reality of harm or a type of harm.107 On this account, courts have not
been engaged in direct contradiction. Yet the double-sided use of
“tangible” risks both creating confusion108 and fueling an assump-
tion that certain types of harm (for example, economic harm) are
ition of the new term has been offered, but I assume it requires that a litigant suffer tangible
injury that distinguishes him from the populace at large.” (footnote omitted)); William L.
Pham, Comment, Section 633 of IIRIRA: Immunizing Discrimination in Immigrant Visa
Processing, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1481 (1998) (“Standing, therefore, requires a showing of
some tangible injury, whether economic or otherwise.”).
104. See, e.g., ADAPSO, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970) (holding that “aesthetic, conserva-
tional, and recreational” values, or “a spiritual stake in First Amendment values,” count for
standing purposes (first quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616
(1965); and then citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963))); see also, e.g.,
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992) (“[T]he desire to use or observe an
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for
purpose of standing.”); Bayefsky, supra note 28, at 1571-76; Kreimer, supra note 17, at 774-95.
105. For discussions of the tension between the Court’s suggestion that “tangible” harm is
required for standing and the Court’s acceptance of “intangible” harm as injury in fact, see
Nichol, supra note 20, at 74-75, 87; Kreimer, supra note 17, at 752-54; and Re, supra note 64,
at 1202. 
106. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 637 (3d Cir.
2017). 
107. See Wu, supra note 17, at 440 n.6 (“The Court’s use of the term ‘tangible’ in Spokeo
must have been different from its use in Hollingsworth, because in Spokeo, the Court dis-
tinguished between tangibility and concreteness.”). 
108. An example of the consequences of this dual usage of “tangible” appeared in the
briefing on Spokeo’s renewed certiorari petition following the Ninth Circuit’s decision on
remand. Robins’s brief in opposition to certiorari argued that suffering “real-world harm”
meant suffering “tangible” harm, and that Spokeo was therefore seeking to undermine the
Court’s previous determination that intangible harm could be concrete by seeking “to impose
on a plaintiff alleging an intangible harm the duty to show that he has also suffered, or soon
will suffer, a tangible harm.” Brief in Opposition at 16 & n.1, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 138 S.
Ct. 931 (2018) (No. 17-806). The Court’s usage of “tangible” in Spokeo, however, suggests that
“tangible” is not the same as “real.” See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016);
see also Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Spokeo, 138 S. Ct. 831 (No. 17-806) (“Robins falsely
equates ‘real-world harm’ with ‘tangible harm.’”).
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“concrete” or “real” simply because they are sometimes called “tangi-
ble.”
Spokeo held squarely that intangible harm can be concrete and
can, as a result, constitute injury in fact.109 In doing so, however,
Spokeo endorsed a distinctive inquiry for courts to use in deciding
whether intangible harm is concrete: one focused on “history and
the judgment of Congress.”110 Craig Konnoth and Seth Kreimer have
plausibly suggested that tangibility in Spokeo is “a sufficient but
not a necessary condition” for concreteness.111 That is, a court is to
determine whether an alleged injury is particularized; if so, the
court is to ask whether the injury is tangible; if so, the injury is
concrete, and if not, the court is to ask whether the injury has been
recognized by history or Congress.112 Or, as one court recently
stated, “An injury ... is concrete if it is ‘tangible.’ An ‘intangible’
harm may also be concrete where it is a de facto harm that the
legislature has ‘identif[ied] and elevat[ed]’ such that an individual
may seek relief when [he or she] suffer[s] a harm.”113
Spokeo suggests, at a minimum, that tangible harms are recog-
nized in a more straightforward way than intangible ones—or that,
as one commentator put it, “[t]angible injuries ... more easily pass
the concreteness test than intangible injuries.”114 The Spokeo Court,
after all, noted that tangible harms “are perhaps easier to recognize”
and excluded tangible harms from particular inquiries applied to
gauge concreteness.115 This is not to say that tangible harm is
automatically considered cognizable injury; all harm must still be
109. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. For an earlier example in which the Supreme Court
indicated that intangible harm could be real, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 261 (1978)
(referring to “real, if intangible, injury”).
110. Id.
111. Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 18, at 51-52; see also id. at 62.
112. Id. at 62. U.S. District Judge Henry E. Hudson, in an article written with his former
law clerks Christopher Keegan and P. Thomas DiStanislao, III, has come to a similar conclu-
sion: “At the first step, courts should assess whether the plaintiff has suffered a tangible harm
as a result of the statutory violation.... [If not,] courts should then inquire whether he has
suffered one of the specific types of intangible harms sufficient to confer Article III standing.”
Hudson, Keegan & DiStanislao, supra note 28, at 21.
113. Raden v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., No. 16-12808, 2017 WL 3085371,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2017) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting and citing
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548-49).
114. Manring, supra note 25, at 2535.
115. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
2018] CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY AND TANGIBILITY 2309
“actual or imminent.”116 But tangible harm need not undergo, it
seems, as much analysis as its intangible counterpart—if any—to
be considered concrete.
Turning from the Court’s doctrinal moves to the conceptual basis
for these steps, the Spokeo Court’s distinction between tangible and
intangible harm can be understood partially as a response to issues
of legitimacy and remedial authority raised by the Court’s emphasis
on concreteness as a prerequisite for injury in fact. Tangibility per-
mits courts to sidestep the concreteness inquiry in cases involving
more traditional types of harm—typically, as noted below, economic
or physical harm117—without opening the doors too widely to other
forms of harm, such as those stemming from privacy violations or
unwanted contact by debt collectors. Courts can thereby avoid
extensive and potentially contentious concreteness inquiries in a
wide variety of cases while restricting the circumstances in which
courts can be asked to reorder the status quo in order to redress
more apparently nebulous harms. Further, the Spokeo Court’s turn
to historical common law courts and Congress to gauge the concrete-
ness of intangible harm could represent an effort to bolster the
legitimacy of standing determinations by identifying sources of
authority beyond contemporary federal courts to guide these deter-
minations.
Yet under Spokeo, the federal courts have the last word on the
cognizability of intangible harm. The next Section points out, in
examining the post-Spokeo landscape, that Spokeo’s concreteness
analysis for intangible harm actually licenses an expansion of
judicial discretion.
D. After Spokeo: Deciding Whether Harm Is Real
Spokeo’s invocation of tangibility has made its way into the de-
cision-making processes of federal appellate and district courts.
These courts, while noting that intangible harm can be concrete,
have frequently treated the “history” and “judgment of Congress”
factors laid out in Spokeo as the pathways to cognizability for
116. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 140 (2010)).
117. See infra Part II.A.
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intangible harm.118 Some courts have skirted debates about the
cognizability of intangible harm by pointing to a tangible harm that
a plaintiff had suffered. For example, a Minnesota federal court
found cognizable injury because the defendant’s transmission of an
unwanted fax “disrupted [plaintiff ’s] business by tying up its fax
line, wasted [plaintiff ’s] paper and ink, and wasted the time of
[plaintiff ’s] employees.”119 The court referred to this injury as “tan-
gible” and thus distinguished cases involving “the intangible injury
experienced when personal data is lost or retained.”120 Courts’ post-
Spokeo jurisprudence is still developing and has taken varied paths.
For instance, the Third Circuit found standing, in a case about an
unsolicited phone call, based on the plaintiff ’s intangible harms
rather than the plaintiff ’s tangible ones.121 Nevertheless, the
inquiry into the concreteness of intangible harm appears to be more
complex than for its tangible counterpart; as the Ninth Circuit put
it on remand in Spokeo, intangible harm is a “somewhat murky
area” in which “Congress’s judgment as to what amounts to a real,
concrete injury is instructive.”122
Courts’ standing determinations in this “murky area”—that is,
their evaluations of the concreteness of intangible harm—are by no
means mechanical investigations. The guideposts that Spokeo
118. See, e.g., Demarais v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A., 869 F.3d 685, 691-92 (8th Cir. 2017); In
re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 637 (3d Cir. 2017) (quot-
ing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549); see also Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018); Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d
1336, 1340 (11th Cir. 2017). 
119. Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. MedTox Sci., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 354, 357 & n.1 (D.
Minn. 2017).
120. Id. at 359 n.2; see also Horton v. Sw. Med. Consulting, LLC, No. 17-CV-0266-CVE-mjx,
2017 WL 2951922, at *1, *4 & n.5 (N.D. Okla. July 10, 2017) (determining that a plaintiff had
alleged cognizable “tangible injuries” in the form of lost “paper, ink, and toner” resulting from
the transmission of an unwanted fax and, accordingly, declining to address the plaintiff ’s
alleged “intangible injuries,” such as “invasion of privacy and occupation of his fax machine”);
Stromberg v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15-cv-04719-JST, 2017 WL 2686540, at *1, *6
(N.D. Cal. June 22, 2017) (stating that “expenditures of time and money” in ensuring that a
mortgage was recorded were not “intangible,” but “[r]ather ... precisely the kinds of concrete
injuries that support Article III standing,” so that “the Supreme Court’s concerns in Spokeo
about bare statutory violations and intangible harms simply are not implicated here”).
121. See Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351-52 (3d Cir. 2017) (ruling that
the plaintiff ’s intangible harms of “nuisance and invasion of privacy” were concrete and thus
not reaching the question of whether the plaintiff ’s alleged tangible injuries were cognizable).
122. Robins, 867 F.3d at 1112.
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identified were “history and the judgment of Congress.”123 The his-
torical inquiry focuses on the closeness of the relationship between
the “alleged intangible harm” and “a harm that has traditionally
been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
American courts.”124
But the relationship between an alleged harm and a common law
injury depends on the feature of the claimed harm on which a court
focuses, as well as the court’s interpretation of the scope of the his-
torical cause of action. An example comes from lawsuits against
banks for failing to present mortgage satisfaction notices for re-
cording within a statutorily prescribed time, even if the banks
presented the notices by the time suit was brought.125 A court in the
Southern District of New York held that a plaintiff bringing such a
claim had suffered concrete injury in fact, noting that the “intangi-
ble harm” the plaintiff had alleged—“a cloud on title”—had “a close
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as pro-
viding a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”126 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that such a
plaintiff had alleged no concrete injury.127 In doing so, the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished the suit from historical actions to quiet title on
the basis that the historical actions “provided a remedy to prevent
the risk of harm that occurred while title to property was wrongfully
clouded, not a remedy after the cloud was lifted.”128 Courts have also
diverged on whether a lawsuit to challenge a company’s procure-
ment of a consumer report on a prospective employee without
obtaining the employee’s authorization is sufficiently similar to
common law torts involving the violation of privacy.129 Comparing
123. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
124. Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775-
77 (2000)).
125. See, e.g., Bellino v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 209 F. Supp. 3d 601, 603-04
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).
126. Id. at 609 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
127. Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 839 F.3d 998, 1003 (11th Cir. 2016).
128. Id.; see also Zia v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1341 & n.1 (S.D. Fla.
2016) (finding no common law cause of action analogous to suits based on a delay in recording
a mortgage satisfaction notice, and distinguishing from historical common law causes of
action involving a failure to record a notice, rather than a delay in recording). 
129. Compare Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 623, 635 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding
that a company’s procurement of a consumer report on a prospective employee without ob-
taining the employee’s authorization is sufficiently related to violations of privacy recognized
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statutory violations to common law causes of action requires
threshold decisions about which kinds of similarities and distinc-
tions are relevant and about the level of generality at which the
harm ought to be defined.
In addition to the historical inquiry, Spokeo drew attention to “the
judgment of Congress.”130 But this analysis, too, relies on contest-
able judgments about legislative intent and the likelihood that a
given harm will occur. Courts are implicitly called upon to make
these judgments, for instance, in applying a test adopted by the
Second and Ninth Circuits to implement Spokeo’s statements on the
relationship between statutory violations and intangible harm. This
test is “(1) whether the statutory provisions at issue were estab-
lished to protect [a plaintiff ’s] concrete interests (as opposed to pur-
ely procedural rights), and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural
violations alleged in this case actually harm, or present a material
risk of harm to, such interests.”131
The first prong of this test involves an inquiry into congressional
purpose—not always a straightforward examination. Several courts
have examined legislative history to ascertain congressional pur-
pose.132 Though the turn to legislative history is not a necessary
implication of Spokeo, this move may be encouraged by the test’s
suggestion that courts look past Congress’s identification of a legal
violation to the purposes that Congress, in identifying the violation,
was seeking to advance.133 Regardless of how courts ascertain
at common law), with Dilday v. Directv, LLC, No. 3:16CV996-HEH, 2017 WL 1190916, at *4
(E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2017) (finding an insufficient relationship because “the tort of publicity
given to private life” did not “permit suit for merely sharing private information with a single
third party” instead of disseminating the information more broadly); see also Bassett v. ABM
Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the “printing of [the
plaintiff ’s] credit card expiration date on a receipt that he alone viewed” was insufficiently
close to common law torts involving the violation of privacy because there was no “disclosure
of private information to a third party”).
130. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
131. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931
(2018); see also Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016).
132. See, e.g., Robins, 867 F.3d at 1114; Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983 (9th
Cir. 2017); Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 740 (2018); Hatch v. Demayo, 1:16CV925, 2017 WL 4357447, at *4
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2017).
133. Textualists can, however, seek to make “objective inference[s] of purpose” without
turning to legislative history. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?
106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 85 (2006).
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congressional purpose, the basic question is what would justify a
court in deciding that Congress enacted a provision in order to
protect “purely procedural rights” rather than to advance any
“concrete interests.”134 At least in the absence of a congressional
statement that a given procedural requirement does not help to pre-
vent a specified harm,135 the judicial determination that Congress
sought to prevent no “concrete harm” in enacting legislation raises
questions about judicial respect for legislative processes.
More weight therefore falls on the second prong of the test laid
out by the Second and Ninth Circuits, namely “whether the specific
procedural violations alleged in [a particular] case actually harm, or
present a material risk of harm to, [the plaintiff ’s concrete] inter-
ests.”136 The outcome of this analysis depends on how courts define
the relevant harm. For example, courts could characterize the ab-
sence of particular statutorily required disclosures—say, a credit
report’s listing of a defunct credit card company rather than the
company’s servicer as a source of information—as harmless because
the plaintiff did not allege that the absence of the required disclo-
sure made the process of obtaining an accurate credit report less
efficient.137 However, courts could also treat the absence of a statu-
torily required disclosure in more general terms, as a failure to pro-
vide information that legally must be disclosed, akin to the failure
to disclose information sought pursuant to the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, which the Supreme Court has treated as cognizable
134. Robins, 867 F.3d at 1113.
135. See Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting
Congress’s finding in a statute that printing an expiration date on a receipt, in violation of a
prior statute, did not prevent identity theft, and determining that an alleged injury was not
concrete); Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2017)
(same); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 727-29 (7th Cir. 2016) (same),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2267 (2017).
136. Robins, 867 F.3d at 1113; see Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190. But see In re Horizon Health-
care Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 638-39, 639 n.19 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that
an alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act stemming from the theft of a laptop
containing personal information sufficed for injury in fact even without an allegation of a
“material risk of harm” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016))).
137. Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Hagy
v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding no standing for plaintiffs
alleging that a letter failed to make the statutorily required disclosure that the letter was
from a debt collector, because the plaintiffs did “not say that the non-disclosure created a risk
of double payment, caused anxiety, or led to any other concrete harm”).
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injury.138 The level of generality at which harm is defined thus
affects its cognizability.
The issue of defining harm also affects the likelihood that plain-
tiffs will suffer harm to their “concrete interests.” Spokeo thrust this
question into the spotlight by noting that certain procedural vio-
lations do not “present any material risk of harm.”139 In doing so,
Spokeo raised the issue of how the “material risk of harm” inquiry
related to the Supreme Court’s previously stated requirement that
injury in fact be “actual or imminent,” interpreted to mean that the
harm must be “certainly impending” or, at least, that there be a
“substantial risk” that the harm would occur.140
In particular, the definition of harm may vary between the two
inquiries. For example, the Ninth Circuit on remand in Spokeo ex-
plained that Robins had alleged a “real risk of harm” to his “employ-
ment prospects” and had suffered anxiety as a result of this risk.141
But then the question arose whether Robins had sufficiently alleged
that his employment prospects would be “imminently” affected. The
Ninth Circuit sidestepped this question by stating that Robins had
alleged “actual or imminent” injury because he had already suffered
the “intangible injury” of having inaccurate information dissemi-
nated about him.142 But this move may have redefined the relevant
harm from an adverse effect in the employment arena to the
dissemination of inaccurate information in and of itself. The “mater-
ial risk of harm” and “actual or imminent” standards, then, might
be reconciled by shifting the definition of the harm at issue. The
overall point is that courts’ decisions about how to characterize
harm affect the shape of the standing inquiry.
The material risk of harm standard raises two further issues
about the exercise of judicial discretion. First, courts face a question
138. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (“Our decisions
interpreting the Freedom of Information Act have never suggested that those requesting
information under it need show [for standing purposes] more than that they sought and were
denied specific agency records.”). For an example of a post-Spokeo case holding, partially on
the basis of Public Citizen, that a violation of the FCRA’s disclosure requirements constituted
a concrete injury, see Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 623, 635 (E.D. Va. 2016).
139. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016); see also id. (remanding to the
Ninth Circuit to ascertain “whether the particular procedural violations alleged in this case
entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement”).
140. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013).
141. Robins, 867 F.3d at 1116-17.
142. Id. at 1118.
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about how to decide whether the risk of harm is material. This de-
termination could involve a relatively fact-intensive inquiry at the
outset of a case,143 potentially consuming additional judicial resourc-
es. Second, and most fundamentally, courts deciding that a statu-
tory violation poses no material risk of harm override congressional
determinations that the likelihood of real harm was sufficiently
grave to justify imposing a procedural requirement.144 It is unclear
why courts are justified in taking this step. 
Spokeo’s inquiries into history and congressional judgment thus
require courts to use considerable discretion in defining harm, char-
acterizing common law causes of action, gauging congressional
intent, and calibrating risk. While the exercise of judicial discretion
is not necessarily a negative phenomenon, it suggests that Spokeo’s
invocation of history and congressional judgment compounds, rather
than alleviates, concerns about the legitimacy of judicial action in
gauging the concreteness of harm. For the inquiry that Spokeo
applied to intangible harm requires courts to make contested and
potentially value-laden judgments that may override congressional
determinations about how to protect against certain types of harm. 
This Part has examined the principles underlying the emergence
of concreteness and tangibility as aspects of constitutional standing
doctrine. The next Part addresses the issue of when harm is con-
sidered tangible or intangible in the first place—that is, when a
more searching concreteness analysis is triggered. 
Before doing so, it is worth addressing the possible worry that
closely parsing the meaning of terms in judicial opinions places too
much weight on subtle linguistic differences.145 The Supreme Court
has, after all, cautioned that “the language of an opinion is not
always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a
143. See Katz v. Donna Karan Co., L.L.C., 872 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2017) (indicating that
affidavits, “limited jurisdictional discovery,” and “a fact-finding hearing with expert witness
testimony may very well be appropriate” under some circumstances to evaluate the risk of
harm for standing purposes); Kimble v. W. Ray Jamieson, P.C., No. 2:17-cv-02187-SHM-tmp,
2018 WL 814225, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 9, 2018) (“Determining whether there is a concrete
injury requires a factual inquiry.”).
144. See Wu, supra note 17, at 459 (“The overall concreteness inquiry, though, invites
courts to substitute their judgments of risk for that of legislatures, again usurping the legis-
lative role.”). 
145. I am grateful to Andrew Hessick for raising these points. 
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statute.”146 Yet the Supreme Court has given legal effect to terms
such as “concrete” and “tangible,” and other courts in the aftermath
of Spokeo have been wrestling with how to apply these concepts to
specific factual situations. It is therefore valuable to gain a fuller
understanding of the terms that the Court used. This is not to sug-
gest that these terms have one fixed meaning whenever they are
invoked. On the contrary: the next Part highlights the variable
meanings of “tangible” in order to argue that the application of this
label to certain types of harm reflects contestable normative judg-
ments. 
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF TANGIBILITY
This Part examines several ways to conceptualize tangibility. It
both highlights the difficulties with assigning this concept a role in
standing doctrine and demonstrates that the tangible/intangible
distinction exacerbates rather than ameliorates the challenge of
making consistent and principled standing determinations. First,
the Part notes, Spokeo does not explain the nature of tangibility, but
prior cases and commentary suggest that two particular types of
harm are most likely to be considered tangible: physical and econ-
omic harm. Second, the identification of physical and economic harm
as tangible in the standing context is not an automatic step; rather,
it represents a normatively inflected effort to delineate human
interests that federal courts are clearly justified in seeking to
remedy. This endeavor, however, results in contestable judgments
about citizens’ essential interests and oversimplifies economic and
physical harm. Third, the tangible/intangible distinction might be
thought to track characteristics such as commensurability with
money, quantifiability, and susceptibility to evidentiary proof, but
these qualities are themselves ill-suited to playing a role in the
standing analysis. This Part thus deconstructs the distinction
between tangible and intangible harm and highlights adverse con-
sequences of incorporating this distinction into standing doctrine.
146. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979).
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A. The Meaning of Tangibility in Spokeo
Spokeo included no explicit definition of “tangible” or “intangi-
ble.” In fact, Spokeo provided more guidance about what “tangible”
is not than about what tangible is. Most importantly, Spokeo
indicated that “tangible” does not mean “actual” or “real,” because
intangible harms can be “concrete,” understood as “de facto” or
“actually exist[ing].”147 The Court thereby took off the table one
plausible dictionary definition of “tangible,”148 a definition suggested
in previous cases.149 
As for a more positive characterization of tangibility, Spokeo can
be read to describe at least three types of harm as intangible: cer-
tain constitutional violations, the results of procedural vioations,
and the risk of harm. Each of these categories, however, raises fur-
ther questions about the nature of tangibility.
First, Spokeo’s most prominent instances of concrete yet intangi-
ble harm were drawn from constitutional cases involving the in-
fringement of free speech and free exercise rights.150 Because the
free speech and free exercise cases cited in Spokeo did not mention
standing,151 they did not create precedent on the standing issue152
and, more significantly, contained no injury-in-fact analysis that
could be extended to other cases. The Court may have cited these
cases to avoid treating as cognizable more controversial forms of
intangible harm, such as damage to “[a]esthetic” interests153 or stig-
matic harm.154
147. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548-49 (2016). 
148. Tangible, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG. LANGUAGE, https://ahdictionary.com/word/
search.html?q=tangible [https://perma.cc/UC7Y-P56Q] (defining “tangible” as, inter alia,
“[p]ossible to be treated as fact; real or concrete”). For additional dictionary definitions, see
infra Part II.B.2.
149. See supra Part I.C.
150. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535, 547 (1993)).
151. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
152. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011) (“When a potential
jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not
stand for the proposition that no defect existed.”); see also Baude, supra note 28, at 220 &
n.137.
153. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 734 (1972). 
154. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56, 757 n.22 (1984) (denying standing on
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The notion of intangible yet concrete constitutional violations
raises the question of what it means to call legal violations “intangi-
ble.”155 To say that the failure to perform a legal duty is “tangible”
or “intangible” seems incoherent. The terms “tangible” and “intangi-
ble” are best suited to describing not legal violations (injuria, or
legal wrongs), but the harm that results from legal violations
(damnum, or factual harm).156 The Spokeo Court, however, did not
indicate that the plaintiffs in the free speech and free exercise cases
experienced specific harmful effects as a result of these legal viola-
tions.157 One might surmise that these plaintiffs experienced “down-
stream” harms such as emotional distress or stigma, but Spokeo did
not suggest that the finding of concrete harm depended on the
existence of these effects. Indeed, the harmful effects of the free
speech and free exercise violations were not clearly intangible; in
the free exercise case, at least, the ordinance that plaintiffs chal-
lenged as a violation of the free exercise clause imposed penalties of
fines and prison time for disobedience.158 
The Spokeo Court, instead of indicating that “intangible” harm
resulted from these constitutional violations, may have been sug-
gesting that the violation of free speech or free exercise rights is
inherently harmful. This approach would be akin to courts’ practice,
in deciding whether to grant an injunction, of presuming irreparable
harm from certain constitutional violations.159 Perhaps a legal
the basis of stigmatic injury, but noting that this injury might be cognizable when plaintiffs
are personally subject to discriminatory treatment); Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and
Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 428-30 (2007) (describing the treatment of stigmatic harm in
Allen v. Wright). For further discussion of the recognition of intangible injuries, see Bayefsky,
supra note 28, at 1570-76; and Kreimer, supra note 17, at 774-90.
155. I am grateful to Richard Fallon for discussion of this point. 
156. See supra Part I.B.
157. The Spokeo Court also did not specify which intangible harms resulted from libel and
slander per se, which the Court described as injuries for which the common law has permitted
recovery even if these tort victims’ harms are “difficult to prove or measure.” Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). Libel and slander per se are actionable in the absence
of “special harm,” including proven damage to the plaintiff ’s reputation or pecuniary loss. See
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 569 (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (libel); id. § 570 (slander per se).
158. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 528
(1993); see also Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 18, at 52 (“Lukumi involved the threat of a
$500 fine or sixty days in jail for engaging in ritual animal sacrifice, and in Summum, efforts
by the plaintiffs to erect their ‘stone monument’ would have likely been met with force or legal
sanctions.” (footnote omitted)).
159. See, e.g., Beatrice Catherine Franklin, Note, Irreparability, I Presume? On Assuming
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violation can be “intangible,” then, if the violation by its nature
gives rise to harm, and that harm is not “tangible.” In this case,
however, Spokeo’s allusions to legal violations that necessarily cause
intangible harm do not resolve the issue of which kinds of harm are
tangible. Further, these examples do not shed light on how tangibil-
ity applies to legal violations that are not viewed as inherently
harmful, such as the violations of the FCRA at issue in Spokeo.160
A second set of intangible harm cases discussed in Spokeo
involved “procedural” violations, notably violations of statutorily
mandated procedures.161 Spokeo, like earlier cases, suggested that
procedural violations, unlike certain constitutional violations, are
not necessarily harmful in themselves.162 Rather, a plaintiff seeking
to redress a procedural violation must allege that the violation in
question gave rise to a separate, if “intangible,” harm. But this view
does not provide much guidance about the nature of intangible
harm. Moreover, the line between “procedural” and “substantive”
statutory provisions is not a sharp one. A statutory requirement
that landlords provide accurate information to all prospective ten-
ants could be read to confer “a legal right to truthful information
about available housing”163—seemingly a substantive right—or to
mandate that landlords follow certain procedures in renting apart-
ments, akin to “procedural” statutory provisions mandating that
debt collectors make certain disclosures.164 Spokeo’s references to
Irreparable Harm for Constitutional Violations in Preliminary Injunctions, 45 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 623, 640 (2014). But see id. at 649 (noting, however, that “[t]he irreparable harm
presumption is by no means universally recognized”).
160. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural require-
ments may result in no harm.”). 
161. Id. at 1549.
162. For previous expressions of a similar view, see, for example, Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete
interest that is affected by the deprivation ... is insufficient to create Article III standing.”);
and Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.8 (1992) (“An individual can[ ] enforce
procedural rights ... so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some
threatened concrete interest.”).
163. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982). 
164. See Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2016) (referring to a
bank’s failure to make a statutorily required notification to a consumer as a “bare procedural
violation”). Since Spokeo, some courts have stressed the procedural/substantive distinction
in assessing standing. See, e.g., Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983-84 (9th Cir.
2017) (“[A]lthough the FCRA outlines procedural obligations that sometimes protect individ-
ual interests, the [Video Privacy Protection Act] identifies a substantive right to privacy that
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procedural violations, therefore, do not clearly illuminate the
meaning of “intangible” harm.
A third type of harm that Spokeo can be read to characterize as
intangible is the “risk of real harm.”165 The idea is that Congress
may require defendants to follow certain procedures in order to
avoid inflicting “real” harm on plaintiffs; as long as the feared harm
is “real,” and there is a sufficiently high risk that the harm will
occur, the violation of statutorily mandated procedures can consti-
tute injury in fact even if the feared harm has not yet occurred.166
This use of “intangible” seems to be similar to the formulation “not
yet real.” But if “intangible” is to describe a particular type of harm
rather than the reality of harm, then the use of “intangible” to refer
to future harm does not help to explain which types of harms are
intangible.
Spokeo thus describes as intangible the results of inherently
harmful legal violations and some effects of procedural violations,
as well as the risk of harm. This enumeration does not, however,
explain why certain types of harm are tangible and others intangi-
ble. A more specific vision of the distinction, however, emerges from
the work of courts and commentators who have suggested that
“tangible” encompasses two specific types of harm: physical and
economic.167 The next Section argues that the association of tangi-
bility with physical and economic harm reflects a misguided effort
suffers any time a video service provider discloses otherwise private information.”); Pisarz v.
GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, No. 16-4552 (FLW), 2017 WL 1102636, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2017)
(“[S]tanding based on a violation of a statutorily created right turns on whether such a right
is substantive or merely procedural.”).
165. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (suggesting that “risk of real harm” could “satisfy the re-
quirement of concreteness”); see also Greenley v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 271 F. Supp.
3d 1128, 1137 (D. Minn. 2017) (same). For discussion of the role of risk in the Supreme Court’s
standing jurisprudence, see F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
55, 61-65 (2012); and Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1283, 1290-1304 (2013).
166. See Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190 (“[E]ven where Congress has accorded procedural rights
to protect a concrete interest, a plaintiff may fail to demonstrate concrete injury where
violation of the procedure at issue presents no material risk of harm to that underlying
interest.”).
167. See, e.g., Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 18, at 52; Solove & Citron, supra note 17, at
755; see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 642 (2007) (Souter,
J., dissenting); Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 995 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam).
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to identify uncontroversially legitimate human interests that would
support judicial redress.
B. Tangibility and “Injury to Flesh or Purse” 168
1. The Treatment of Physical and Economic Harm
In the standing context, courts and commentators have frequent-
ly—though not uniformly—cast two types of harm as tangible. One
is economic harm. The Supreme Court has distinguished “‘nonecon-
omic’ and probably noncompensable” injuries from “tangible econ-
omic injuries,”169 and federal courts of appeals have associated
economic harm with tangibility.170 Economic harm is also frequently
treated as clearly sufficient for Article III injury in fact; as then-
Judge Alito of the Third Circuit put it, “While it is difficult to reduce
injury-in-fact to a simple formula, economic injury is one of its
paradigmatic forms.”171 Types of economic harm that are considered
injury in fact include not only the loss of a specified amount of
funds,172 but also the impairment of more complex economically
valuable interests, such as intellectual property,173 securities,174
168. Hein, 551 U.S. at 641.
169. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 (1981);
see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 475 n.11 (1982).
170. See, e.g., Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195,
203 (4th Cir. 2017) (“An Establishment Clause claim is justiciable even when plaintiffs claim
noneconomic or intangible injury.”); In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig.,
846 F.3d 625, 635 (3d Cir. 2017) (referring to “economic or other tangible harm”); L.A. Haven
Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 2011) (contrasting “economic or
pecuniary injury” with “less tangible forms of injury”).
171. Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005); see also
Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]here a plaintiff alleges financial
harm, standing ‘is often assumed without discussion.’” (quoting Danvers, 432 F.3d at 293));
Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[Even a] dollar of economic
harm is still an injury-in-fact for standing purposes.”).
172. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“[A] loss of even
a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’”).
173. See, e.g., Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 115-16 (2d Cir.
2009) (finding standing to bring claim for misappropriation of trade secrets); Morrow v. Micro-
soft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A patent grant bestows the legal right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention.... Consti-
tutional injury in fact occurs when a party performs at least one prohibited action with
respect to the patented invention that violates these exclusionary rights.”); Kreimer, supra
note 17, at 793-94 (“Holders of patent and copyright entitlements may bring actions in federal
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rights to payment under a contract,175 and entitlements to legal
claims in bankruptcy.176 The second type of harm considered
tangible is physical harm,177 which is viewed as a “well-established
injur[y]-in-fact under federal standing jurisprudence.”178 Commenta-
tors have joined these courts in conceiving of physical or economic
harm as tangible.179
court simply because others have acted in respect to information ways that the right holders
believe to violate the law.”); see also Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 18, at 52 (referring, in
characterizing “tangible injuries” in Spokeo, to “the value of economic interests, including
intellectual property rights”).
174. See Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 123 (1991) (holding that a plaintiff can have a
“financial stake” in the outcome of a case brought under certain provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act by owning a “security,” including “stock, notes, warrants, bonds, debentures,
puts, calls, and a variety of other financial instruments”).
175. See, e.g., Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd., 531 F.3d 767, 774
(9th Cir. 2008); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 316 (1990)
(referring to the “right to contract” as “tangible”). The Supreme Court determined that it had
jurisdiction to review a state court decision invalidating mineral leases, which the Court
labeled “tangible legal rights.” ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618-19 (1989).
176. See, e.g., Howe v. Richardson, 193 F.3d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1999); In re James Wilson
Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 168 (7th Cir. 1992). 
177. See, e.g., Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 995 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (referring to the “tangible economic or physical harm that courts often expect”); Suhre
v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that “the Establishment
Clause plaintiff is not likely to suffer physical injury or pecuniary loss” and then indicating
that “rules of standing recognize that noneconomic or intangible injury may suffice to make
an Establishment Clause claim justiciable”). For other cases associating tangibility with econ-
omic and physical harm, see, for example, Schweer v. HOVG, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-01528, 2017
WL 2906504, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2017); Pogorzelski v. Patenaude & Felix APC, No. 16-C-
1330, 2017 WL 2539782, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 2017); and Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., No.
2:15-0190 (WJM), 2017 WL 2443062, at *2 (D.N.J. June 6, 2017).
178. Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1172 (11th Cir. 2014); see also FEC
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (casting “a widespread mass tort” as an instance in which
harm is “concrete, though widely shared”).
179. Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 18, at 52 (“[T]angible injuries apparently embrace ...
physical interference.” (footnote omitted)); Manring, supra note 25, at 2535 (“Tangible injuries
such as physical harm more easily pass the concreteness test than intangible injuries.”); see
also Hudson, Keegan & DiStanislao, supra note 28, at 22 (assenting to the view of Konnoth
and Kreimer). For pre-Spokeo analyses, see Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environ-
mental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 468 (2008) (stating that the injury-in-fact requirement
reflects a bias that “favor[s] tangible, economic harms over less tangible, less measurable
harms”); Kreimer, supra note 17, at 752 (challenging “an account of Article III that insists on
‘direct,’ ‘tangible,’ and ‘palpable’ injuries to physical or economic interests as the ticket of
admission to the federal courthouse”); and Townsend, supra note 88, at 80 (“[N]ot all harms
that we care about are tangible. Many wrongs do not lead to bodily damage, economic damage,
damage to property, or other physical correlates that can be pointed to as ‘real’ harm outside
of the violation of a legal right.”).
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Spokeo did not state that “tangible” refers to economic and phys-
ical harm, but this understanding of tangible harm is compatible
with the examples of intangible harm adduced in Spokeo. Violations
of free speech and free exercise rights, as well as libel and slander
per se,180 do not necessarily involve physical or economic harm. If
Spokeo is read to use “tangible” to refer to physical and economic
harm, then Spokeo suggests that these types of harm can be
concrete without an inquiry into history and congressional judg-
ment. In accordance with this understanding, the Eighth Circuit,
following Spokeo, bifurcated its inquiry into tangible and intangible
harms alleged under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.181 The
court determined that the intangible harm of “being subjected to
attempts to collect debts not owed” was cognizable after a detailed
inquiry into history and congressional judgment,182 and the court
decided that the tangible harm was cognizable because “a loss of
even a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’”183
If “tangible” harm under Spokeo is interpreted to refer to physical
or economic harm, then Spokeo has the effect of distinguishing
“murk[ier]”184 harms, the recognition of which requires legitimiza-
tion by other bodies—notably common law judges and Congress—
from a core set of uncontroversial human interests the impairment
of which self-evidently counts as injury in fact. This point can be
illuminated by reading Spokeo against the background of a dissent
by Justice David Souter in the 2007 case Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Foundation, Inc.185 In Hein, the Supreme Court declined to
extend the concept of “taxpayer standing” in Establishment Clause
cases, accepted in Flast v. Cohen,186 to the context of executive
branch expenditures.187 Justice Souter argued, by contrast, that the
use of taxpayer money to promote religion could count as cognizable
injury and stated that “it would be a mistake to think [Flast] is
180. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
181. Demarais v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A., 869 F.3d 685, 691-93 (8th Cir. 2017).
182. Id. at 691-92. 
183. Id. at 693 (quoting Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017)).
184. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931
(2018).
185. 551 U.S. 587, 637 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
186. 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
187. Hein, 551 U.S. at 608-09 (plurality opinion).
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unique in recognizing standing in a plaintiff without injury to flesh
or purse.”188 He continued:
The question, ultimately, has to be whether the injury alleged is
“too abstract, or otherwise not appropriate, to be considered
judicially cognizable.”
In the case of economic or physical harms, of course, the
“injury in fact” question is straightforward. But once one strays
from these obvious cases, the enquiry can turn subtle. Are
esthetic harms sufficient for Article III standing? What about
being forced to compete on an uneven playing field based on race
(without showing that an economic loss resulted), or living in a
racially gerrymandered electoral district? These injuries are no
more concrete than seeing one’s tax dollars spent on religion, but
we have recognized each one as enough for standing. This is not
to say that any sort of alleged injury will satisfy Article III, but
only that intangible harms must be evaluated case by case.189
Here, Justice Souter appeared to define “intangible” harms as
those that are not “economic” or “physical.” The cognizability of
tangible “economic” or “physical” harm was, in Justice Souter’s view,
“straightforward” or “obvious”—a view echoed, though less defini-
tively, in Spokeo’s statement that “tangible injuries are perhaps
easier to recognize.”190 In Justice Souter’s view, and in Spokeo, “in-
tangible” harms could count as injury in fact, but only on a more
complex, “case by case” basis.191 Spokeo’s references to history and
congressional judgment192 could be viewed as standards by which
courts can undertake such a case-by-case inquiry. This is not to say
that allegations of economic or physical harm will automatically be
accepted as injury in fact. Courts might inquire into the imminence
of these harms or consider whether plaintiffs are engaging in a form
of bootstrapping by seeking redress for the economic effects of avoid-
ing noneconomic harms.193 Still, plaintiffs can show that physical or
188. Id. at 641 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
189. Id. at 642 (footnote omitted) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).
190. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
191. Hein, 551 U.S. at 642.
192. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
193. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 422 (2013) (stating that
plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs in anticipation of non-imminent
harm”); Parker Madison Partners v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-8939 (VSB), 2017 WL 4357952,
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economic harms are concrete without being subject to the inquiries
applied to intangible harm. As the Third Circuit has stated,
plaintiffs “allege that ... violations [of state consumer protection
statutes] caused each of them tangible, economic harm. This
satisfies the concreteness requirement.”194
The tangible/intangible distinction, thus understood, creates two
tiers of harm: one category of “obvious” harm and one category of
harm, the reality of which requires a more complex inquiry. Physical
and economic harms are often conceived as the “obvious” harms that
courts can declare to be concrete without turning to the legitimation
provided by other sources, namely common law judges or congressio-
nal action. On this account, physical and economic harm are types
of human interests, the infringement of which is clearly worthy of
judicial redress. 
The distinction between tangible and intangible is reminiscent of
the category of “primary goods” found in John Rawls’s original A
Theory of Justice: “[T]hings that every rational [person] is presumed
to want.”195 Rawls, interestingly, included in this category not only
“natural goods” such as “health and vigor” and “social primary
goods” such as “income and wealth,” but also “self-respect.”196 Con-
stitutional standing doctrine may not map directly onto Rawls’s cat-
egorization, but both conceptual structures suggest a similar inter-
est in attributing to individuals a set of concerns that, if thwarted,
clearly give rise to harm.197 The implication in the constitutional
standing context is that remedial action taken by courts to redress
physical and economic harm can be justified without resort to
history or congressional judgment as sources of legitimizing author-
ity.
The identification of a set of “obvious” harms might also be
thought to serve other purposes of standing doctrine. One is the
separation of powers; perhaps courts are less likely to exceed their
at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (ruling that allegations of economic harm were insufficiently
specific and definite to ground standing).
194. Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2017).
195. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971). 
196. Id.
197. It may be objected that certain harms, though they genuinely infringe core human
interests, are harder to prove, and that this evidentiary distinction justifies differential
treatment. See infra Part II.C.3 for discussion of the relationship between evidentiary proof
and the tangible/intangible distinction. 
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authority when they take action in response to harms that all would
view as genuine, because there is a clearer need for judicial inter-
vention to redress individual grievances.198 By contrast, harms that
require a judgment call in order to be labeled “real” could create a
greater risk that courts will adjudicate suits concerning the abstract
legality of defendants’ conduct in which the plaintiff has no real
stake—similar, in a sense, to advisory opinions.199 A second interest
that identifying “obvious” harms might further is judicial adminis-
tration. Courts could find it more straightforward to redress phys-
ical and economic harm than to compensate plaintiffs when they
have suffered, for example, reputational, emotional, or stigmatic
damage.200
This Article argues, beginning in the next Subsection, that the
invocation of tangibility to advance these aims oversimplifies phys-
ical and economic harm, and that the concept of tangibility is not
necessary in order to strike an appropriate balance between con-
cerns about the separation of powers and judicial administration, on
the one hand, and values such as ensuring access to the federal
courts to redress legal violations, on the other. Before doing so, it is
worth noting the contestable nature of the view that economic and
physical harm mark the boundaries of uncontroversially legitimate
human interests.
In fact, individuals have many other interests fundamental to
their ability to live, form relationships, and contribute to society in
a constitutional democracy. Proponents of a “capabilities approach”
to defining the prerequisites for adequate human functioning have
identified as such capabilities, for instance, the ability to partici-
pate in social relationships,201 “rights to political participation,”202
the capacity to avoid stigma,203 and “[n]ot having one’s emotional
development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by
198. See infra Part III.A.
199. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 469.
200. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 772, 778 (1985).
201. See SABINA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS: SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH AND POVERTY
REDUCTION 48 tbl.22 (2002); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 79 (2000).
202. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 317 (1999). 
203. See id. at 318.
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traumatic events of abuse or neglect.”204 A focus on economic and
physical well-being to the exclusion of these other goods results in
an overly narrow portrayal of core human interests.
It may be argued that money is the most valuable good because
it facilitates access to every other good. But money cannot always
purchase, say, social relationships or emotional well-being, and the
significance of money in enabling people to access other goods does
not detract from the inherent value of the other goods themselves.
It may also be contended that physical well-being is necessary for
people to enjoy any other good. Physical integrity in the sense of
adequate nourishment and health is indeed essential to any human
life, but this does not mean that other goods, such as “achieving self-
respect or being socially integrated,” are not also “widely valued.”205
Courts, in implicitly assuming that physical and economic harm are
uniquely clear and uncontroversially legitimate human interests,
are making a normative judgment that is subject to question. This
judgment raises the institutional issue of why courts ought to be
tasked with identifying the infringement of certain human interests
as necessarily harmful. Further, the contested nature of this judg-
ment provides reason to be skeptical of the application of a distinc-
tive concreteness analysis to intangible harm. 
One potential response is that Spokeo applies no distinctive
concreteness inquiry to intangible harm, because physical and
economic harm would necessarily count as injury in fact under the
history and congressional judgment analyses of Spokeo. As an initial
matter, however, economic and physical harms are not necessarily
covered by these analyses. Examples of physical harm that have
little basis in historically recognized causes of action include
physical harm to a person whom others have no duty to rescue,206
physical harm encountered by trespassers and other kinds of
entrants on land under various circumstances,207 and certain per-
sonal injuries caused by those not in privity with the injured under
204. NUSSBAUM, supra note 201, at 79. 
205. Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 31 (Martha Nuss-
baum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). 
206. See Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Duty of One Other Than Carrier or Employer to
Render Assistance to One for Whose Initial Injury He Is Not Liable, 33 A.L.R.3d 301, § 2[a]
(1970).
207. See 4 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 14:71 (2015).
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traditional common law rules.208 Some legislatures have changed
the traditional common law rules on these subjects and thereby
elevated certain harms to the status of legal cognizability (for exam-
ple, by eliminating privity requirements209), but other legislatures
have not altered common law rules (for example, in the context of
harm to trespassers210). Physical harm, then, is not necessarily
cognizable by virtue of a comparison with historical causes of action
or through legislative enactments.
The same is true of economic harm. The concept of injury in fact
was invoked in the Supreme Court’s 1970 ADAPSO case to cover a
type of “economic injury” untethered to a traditional right of action:
competition in the data processing business.211 Soon thereafter, the
Court stated that “palpable economic injuries,” such as adverse
effects on tenant farmers’ “economic position vis-à-vis their land-
lords,” had “long been recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for
standing, with or without a specific statutory provision for judicial
review.”212 The injury-in-fact standard thus seems to have resulted
in courts’ cognizing economic injuries that were not viewed as
sufficient for standing under previous common law or statutory
regimes. To provide further examples: economic loss resulting from
negligence has often not been treated as the basis for suit.213 The
Supreme Court has also suggested that a shareholder would have
constitutional—but not statutory—standing “to sue a company for
firing a valuable employee for racially discriminatory reasons, so
long as he could show that the value of his stock decreased as a
consequence.”214 While a shareholder suit understood broadly may
have a common law analogue,215 a shareholder suit for racial
208. See, e.g., Steven Bonanno, Comment, Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties:
A Retrospect of and Prospects for Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
177, 178-79 (1991). The doctrine of contractual privity has since been restricted. See, e.g.,
Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 88 (Cal. 1969).
209. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (2017). 
210. See, e.g., Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning Land-
owner’s Liability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22 A.L.R.4th
294, § 2[a] (1973).
211. ADAPSO, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52, 154 (1970).
212. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1972) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970)).
213. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
214. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 177 (2011).
215. See, e.g., 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1949 (2017).
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discrimination against an employee arguably does not, and the fact
that such a shareholder would not have statutory standing suggests
that this harm has not been elevated by Congress to legal cog-
nizability. Economic harm, then, is not necessarily closely related to
historical causes of action or recognized by statute.
It may be contended that economic and physical harm are related
to a historical cause of action provided that harm is defined at a
sufficient level of generality. For instance, economic harm could be
related to shareholder suits conceived broadly even if not to share-
holder suits for racial discrimination against employees. The same
point might be made about congressional or legislative judgment;
perhaps statutes addressing certain forms of tort liability for caus-
ing physical harm could render harm to trespassers concrete. 
But intangible harms, as suggested above, could also be related
to “history” or “the judgment of Congress”216 if they are defined at an
adequately high level of generality.217 Moreover, the point about
levels of generality highlights a further reason why intangible harm
in Spokeo is subject to a meaningfully different inquiry from that
applied to tangible harm. As noted above, courts’ inquiries into the
concreteness of intangible harm require discretionary and contest-
able decisions about the nature of the harm, the scope of the histor-
ical cause of action, and congressional purpose.218 The application of
these analyses specifically to intangible harm affects the types of
arguments plaintiffs must make, the litigation process (for example,
the extent of jurisdictional discovery at the motion to dismiss stage),
and the extent to which courts can determine that a given intangi-
ble harm has not cleared the threshold.
Given that the association between tangibility and physical and
economic harm affects the standing inquiry, the question is whether
this association is justified. The next Subsection highlights the con-
tingency of this association and examines the principles underlying
it.
216. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
217. See supra Part I.D.
218. See supra Part I.D.
2330 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2285
2. Intangible Elements of Economic and Physical Harm
The link between tangibility and economic and physical harm is
by no means inevitable, for there are legal settings in which aspects
of these harms are considered intangible. To begin with economic
harm, property is categorized in various settings as “tangible” and
“intangible.” As a leading torts casebook explains, “[m]uch personal
property today is intangible, in the form of securities, contract
rights, checks or bank accounts, and protected intangible property
like trademark or copyright,”219 as well as trade secrets.220 The de-
scription of certain types of property as intangible—including types
of intellectual property,221 licenses granted by government agencies,
covenants not to compete, and certain contractual rights222—is found
in the Uniform Commercial Code,223 the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act,224 and Internal Revenue Service publications.225 The Su-
preme Court has adjudicated cases involving a state’s “‘intangibles
tax’ on the fair market value of corporate stock”226 and a federal tax
on “customer-based intangibles” such as “customer lists” and “bank
deposits.”227
219. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 66 n.1 (2d ed. 2017); see also Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (describing the Florida Supreme
Court’s holding that a takings claim based on the alleged imposition of an unconstitutional
condition failed “because the subject of the exaction at issue here was money rather than a
more tangible interest in real property”).
220. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 219, § 734.
221. See also Eureka Water Co. v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 690 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th
Cir. 2012) (“Intellectual property is ... a type of intangible property.”); Blitz U.S.A., Inc. v.
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 75 P.3d 883, 888-89 (Okla. 2003) (“An inventor sells intangible intellectual
property in return for which the inventor receives a royalty. A manufacturer, on the other
hand, sells tangible personal property.” (footnote omitted)).
222. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 219, § 63 n.1 (referring to contract rights as “intangible”);
see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 73, 79 (1961) (treating “obligations”
to pay “sums of money” as “intangibles”).
223. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see also Juliet M.
Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of (In)tangibility, 35 FLA.
ST. L. REV. 119, 122-32 (2007) (criticizing the differential treatment of tangible and intangible
assets in the Uniform Commercial Code). 
224. 28 U.S.C. § 3002(12) (2012).
225. See, e.g., IRS, PUBLICATION 544: SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS 12, 25
(2017).
226. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 327 (1996). 
227. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 557 (1993).
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Along with the possibility of intangible property comes the treat-
ment of certain kinds of economic loss as intangible. In the property
insurance context, for example, courts have characterized “tangible
property” as “things that can be touched, seen, and smelled”228 and,
accordingly, treated as intangible various types of economic injury,
including “loss of the use of money a claimant would have received
but for the insured’s negligence,”229 “allegedly converted bank ac-
count funds,”230 and “decline in stock value.”231 Economic loss is also
described as intangible in the context of the economic loss doctrine
in tort law, which “bars recovery in tort when a party suffers econ-
omic loss unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage.”232
As the Ohio Supreme Court put it, “[T]he general rule is ‘there is no
... duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid intangible economic loss
or losses to others that do not arise from tangible physical harm to
persons and tangible things.’”233 According to a leading treatise,
these “[e]conomic losses encompass objectively verifiable monetary
losses, including loss of property, costs of repair or replacement, loss
of employment, and loss of business or employment opportunities,”
as well as “loss of goodwill; disappointed economic expectations; and
diminution in value.”234
The characterization of economic interests or losses as intangible
is consonant with a prominent and intuitive definition of “tangible”
as “[c]apable of being touched.”235 As a plurality of the Supreme
228. Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 15 P.3d 223, 229 (Cal. 2001); see also Cmty.
Antenna Servs., Inc. v. Westfield Ins., 173 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (defining
“tangible” as “necessarily corporeal” in the sense that the item in question “may be perceived
by any of the bodily senses”).
229. Snug Harbor, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins., 968 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1992).
230. Johnson v. Amica Mut. Ins., 733 A.2d 977, 978 (Me. 1999) (per curiam).
231. Harris v. Suniga, 149 P.3d 224, 225 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 180 P.3d 12 (Or. 2008).
232. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 23 (2017). The economic loss rule is subject to exceptions and varia-
tions; the point here is simply that in certain negligence contexts, unrecoverable economic
losses may be considered intangible.
233. Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. Ass’n, 560 N.E.2d 206, 208
(Ohio 1990) (omission in original) (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEATON, LAW OF
TORTS 657, § 92 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Gus’ Catering, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys., 762 A.2d 804,
807 (Vt. 2000) (“‘[N]egligence law does not generally recognize a duty to exercise reasonable
care to avoid intangible economic loss to another unless one’s conduct has inflicted some
accompanying physical harm,’ which does not include economic loss.” (quoting O’Connell v.
Killington, Ltd., 665 A.2d 39, 42 (Vt. 1995))).
234. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 23 (footnotes omitted).
235. Tangible, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/197491?redirect
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Court recently stated in interpreting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
phrase “tangible object,” “The ordinary meaning of an ‘object’ that
is ‘tangible,’ as stated in dictionary definitions, is ‘a discrete ...
thing,’ that ‘possess[es] physical form.’”236 Many economic inter-
ests—from a debt owed to a creditor, to a stake in a company, to
funds in a bank account—cannot be physically touched.237 In a world
of fiat money,238 the economic value attaching even to the physical
objects of bills and coins is rooted in a web of social understandings,
expectations, and conventions that lack a physical location or phys-
ical form.239
Other understandings of “tangible,” such as “real or concrete”240
and “capable of being precisely identified or realized by the mind,”241
do not involve the capacity to be touched. Indeed, different under-
standings of tangibility can lead to divergent results in the standing
analysis. An example is the waste of a person’s time in fielding un-
wanted phone calls or following up regarding a delay in the record-
ing of a mortgage. Some courts call this type of harm “intangible,”242
edfrom=tangible& [https://perma.cc/CL3L-GREX]. Other dictionaries include similar defini-
tions among the meanings of “tangible.” See Tangible, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (“1. Having or possessing physical form; CORPOREAL. 2. Capable of being touched and
seen; perceptible to the touch.”); AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG. LANGUAGE, supra note 148
(“Discernible by the touch.”); Tangible, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/
tangible?s=t [https://perma.cc/FUD9-XDGG] (“[C]apable of being touched.”); Tangible,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webaster.com/dictionary/tangible
[https://perma.cc/FJY-GZBX] (“[C]apable of being perceived especially by the sense of touch.”).
236. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (alteration in original) (first
quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1555 (2002); and then quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 235, at 1683 (10th ed. 2014)). The Yates dissent adopted
the same “ordinary meaning” of “tangible object.” See id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
237. See, e.g., Johnson v. Amica Mut. Ins., 733 A.2d 977, 979 (Me. 1999) (per curiam)
(“[B]ank account funds are ‘intangible property,’ because they have no intrinsic value and
merely represent, or are evidence of, value.”).
238. See Hilary J. Allen, $=€=Bitcoin?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 884 (2017) (explaining that the
U.S. dollar, a form of fiat money, “is backed only by the full faith and credit of the United
States government and is not redeemable for any commodity”).
239. See John J. Chung, Money as Simulacrum: The Legal Nature and Reality of Money,
5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 109, 120 (2009) (describing money as not “a thing of independent
tangible value”); Moringiello, supra note 223, at 137 (“Money serves as an interesting illustra-
tion of the false distinction between the tangible and the intangible.... [M]oney has no value
at all unless people believe in money.”).
240. AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG. LANGUAGE, supra note 148.
241. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, supra note 235.
242. See, e.g., Abante Rooter & Plumbing, Inc. v. Pivotal Payments, Inc., No. 16-cv-05486-
JCS, 2017 WL 733123, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017); Reichman v. Poshmark, Inc., 267 F.
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perhaps because time (and the loss thereof) have no physical form.
Other courts call the expenditure of time “tangible,”243 perhaps
because the loss of time can be quantified.244 The Third Circuit has,
in fact, declined “to resolve the issue ... of whether wasted time is a
tangible or intangible harm.”245 The existence of this kind of harm
on the boundary between tangible and intangible harm246 further
highlights the malleability of the category of tangible harm.
The overall point is that the link between tangibility and econ-
omic harm does not flow inevitably from the nature of economic
interests. Needless to say, there are also instances outside the
standing setting in which economic harm is considered tangible. In
antidiscrimination law, courts have distinguished “‘economic’ or
‘tangible’ discrimination” from “sexual harassment ... [that] ‘cre-
ate[s] an abusive working environment,’”247 though the Supreme
Court has also referred to “tangible psychological injury.”248 In
privacy law, the Court has differentiated “damages for mental or
emotional distress” from “tangible economic loss.”249 These exam-
ples, however, only underscore the variation in whether “tangible”
is applied to economic harm. This variation suggests that the asso-
ciation between economic harm and tangibility in the standing con-
text warrants critical evaluation.
Physical harm, too, has aspects viewed as intangible outside the
standing context. While the component of physical harm consisting
Supp. 3d 1278, 1284-85 (S.D. Cal. 2017); Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 644-
45 (N.D. W. Va. 2016).
243. See Smith v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1062 (C.D.
Cal. 2017); Cabiness v. Educ. Fin. Sols., LLC, No. 16-cv-01109-JST, 2016 WL 5791411, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016); see also Stromberg v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15-cv-04719-
JST, 2017 WL 2686540, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2017).
244. See infra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of the role of quantifiability in standing doctrine.
245. Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017). 
246. Courts have also split on whether occupying a fax machine (for example, by sending
a junk fax) is tangible harm. Compare, e.g., Horton v. Sw. Med. Consulting, LLC, No. 17-CV-
0266-CVE-mjx, 2017 WL 2951922, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 10, 2017) (occupying a fax machine
is intangible), with Zia v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (oc-
cupying a fax machine is tangible and distinguishable from an “intangible injury” related to
the delayed recording of mortgage documents, the latter of which did not support standing).
247. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (first quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); and then quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
248. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
249. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 287, 303 (2012).
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of bodily damage (say, a bruise on the skin) may be consistently
tangible, the same is not true of a major effect of, or constituent part
of, physical harm: pain and suffering arising from bodily damage.
Pain and suffering are not tangible in the Black’s Law Dictionary
sense of “[h]aving or possessing physical form.”250 Pain and suffering
are frequently treated as intangible in courts’ descriptions of
damages for tortious conduct; the Supreme Court, for example, has
referred to “the intangible pain and suffering caused by an automo-
bile accident.”251
It may be argued that pain and suffering are the “consequent
injury” arising from the “predicate injury” of physical harm and that
the intangibility of the consequent injury does not undermine the
tangibility of the predicate injury.252 Yet pain and suffering them-
selves constitute a major portion of the harm effected by injurious
contact with the body, and they provide an important reason why
victims of such contact are treated as entitled to legal redress.253
Take, for example, an individual with a wound, caused by another
person’s negligent driving, that heals within a few months, is not
visible to the public, and does not prevent the person from going
about his or her daily activities, albeit more painfully than before.
250. See Tangible, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 235.
251. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995); see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.
229, 235 (1992) (suggesting that “emotional distress and pain and suffering” are “intangible
elements of injury”); Acevedo-Luis v. Pagán, 478 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) (“As to pain and
suffering, the court instructed the jury that no evidence of monetary value of such intangible
things needed to be introduced into evidence.”); State v. Gray, 280 P.3d 1110, 1113 n.3 (Wash.
2012) (“Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental anguish, pain
and suffering, or other intangible losses, but may include the costs of counseling reasonably
related to the offense.” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.753(3) (2012))).
252. These terms are adopted from the treatment of negligent infliction of emotional
distress by John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1665 (2002).
253. For example, Stanley Ingber points out that denying compensation for pain and
suffering, as well as emotional damages, “creates the appearance of legal and societal
indifference to the victim’s plight” and “effectively bestows upon the injurer a form of legal
‘entitlement’ to cause the injury.” Ingber, supra note 200, at 781. A Seventh Circuit opinion
by Judge Richard Posner stated that:
We disagree with those students of tort law who believe that pain and
suffering are not real costs and should not be allowable items of damages in a
tort suit.... If they were not recoverable in damages, the cost of negligence would
be less to the tortfeasors and there would be more negligence, more accidents,
more pain and suffering, and hence higher social costs.
Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987).
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When considering exactly why negligent driving has harmed the
person, and excluding the financial costs of treatment, the “intangi-
ble” pain and suffering endured by the person loom large—possibly
larger than the “tangible” impact of the wound on the skin. More
broadly, the harmfulness of physical wounds is deeply connected to
phenomena often viewed as intangible, namely the pain and
suffering that result from damage to the physical body.
As with economic harm, then, the application of the “tangible”
label to physical harm in the constitutional standing context is not
an automatic step; rather, the underlying basis of this association
is subject to question. In undertaking this inquiry, it is worth asking
when economic and physical harms are viewed as intangible.
First, economic and physical harms are viewed as intangible
when compensation for these harms seems difficult or complex to
provide. For example, damage to intangible property could be hard-
er to quantify than damage to tangible property,254 and pain and
suffering could be viewed as both difficult to quantify and chal-
lenging to redress through a monetary award.255 Second, harm may
be labeled intangible as a signal that a particular pathway to legal
recompense is not a suitable vehicle for the remediation of certain
harms. For instance, the law may prevent recovery in tort for
economic losses stemming from breaches of contract.256
Third, harm may be considered intangible when treating harm as
legally cognizable would result in the imposition of a normatively
undesirable form or level of liability. Justifications for the economic
254. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, Co-Invest at Your Own Risk: An Exploration of Potential
Remedial Theories for Breaches of Rights of First Refusal in the Venture Capital Context, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 87, 111 n.118 (2005) (explaining that “damages for the loss of something as
nebulous as an opportunity” consisting of “a musician’s intangible property interest in a
concert performance” would “be particularly difficult to quantify”); S. Christopher Provenzano,
Personal Property, in COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: STRATEGIES FOR DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING
§ 11.06[B] (Vladimir R. Rossman & Morton Moskin eds., 2d ed. 2018) (“[E]quitable remedies
are more readily available with respect to contracts concerning intangible property, which is
more difficult to quantify, define, and value.”).
255. See Ingber, supra note 200, at 774 (“Pain and suffering is essentially the prototype of
a nontransferable, nonquantifiable injury.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“The sensations caused by harm to the body or by pain or
humiliation are not in any way analogous to a pecuniary loss, and a sum of money is not the
equivalent of peace of mind.”).
256. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 23 (2017) (“The economic loss doctrine preserves the distinction
between contract and tort law.”). 
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loss doctrine in negligence law, for instance, include limiting tort
liability so that manufacturers are not “liable for vast sums”257 and
avoiding the “impos[ition of] liability for damages that are specula-
tive,”258 as well as the imposition of “liability that is disproportionate
to fault.”259 These justifications parallel common rationales for
limiting liability for emotional distress,260 which is often considered
intangible.261 
Fourth, the association of certain harms with intangibility may
suggest that these harms are to be taken less seriously. As John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have written in the negligence
context, “[C]ourts have long given ‘second class’ citizenship to emo-
tional distress and intangible economic loss as harms or protected
interests.”262 When economic loss is relegated to “second-class citi-
zenship,” it may be more likely to be called “intangible.”
The treatment of certain harms as tangible or intangible is thus
not merely an empirical characterization, but a normative judgment
that certain types of harms more appropriately trigger judicial
intervention and are better suited to redress through the judicial
process. This point pushes further the critique that “injury in fact”
is a normative criterion, not a factual one.263 The same is true of the
categorization of harm as tangible or intangible for the purposes of
undertaking the injury-in-fact inquiry. Therefore, the notion that
intangible harm should be subject to a more complex or searching
257. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 (1986).
258. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 523, 542 (2009).
259. Id.; see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (stating that
manufacturers “can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects” but
not for “the level of performance of [their] products in the consumer’s business unless [they]
agree[ ] that the product was designed to meet the consumer’s demands”).
260. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 426-27, 435 (1997) (noting
that, in a case on liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act, “[t]he large number of those exposed and the uncertainties that may
surround recovery also suggest ... the problem of ‘unlimited and unpredictable liability’”
(quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994))); Bowen v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Wis. 1994) (citing the concern “that suits would be
brought for trivial emotional distress more dependent on the peculiar emotional sensitivities
of the plaintiff than upon the nature of the tortfeasor’s conduct”).
261. See infra Part II.C. 
262. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 252, at 1668.
263. See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 231; Nichol, supra note 17, at 304-05; Sunstein, supra
note 17, at 188-89.
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standing inquiry remains in need of justification. The next Section
considers and refutes several possible rationales. 
C. Tangibility’s Neighbors: Counting, Proving, and Paying for
Harm
The previous Section argued that tangibility is not an inherent
characteristic of economic and physical harm. It may nevertheless
be contended that certain features of economic and physical harm
render these types of harms more amenable to consideration as in-
jury in fact and that the “tangible” label reflects this greater amena-
bility. This Section examines three such features: commensurability
with money, quantifiability, and susceptibility to evidentiary proof.
This Section argues that the connection between these factors and
economic and physical harm is not as close as it may seem, and the
view that these factors should play a role in constitutional standing
doctrine merits skepticism. There is, therefore, further reason to
doubt that the distinction between tangible and intangible harm
properly influences the shape of the standing inquiry.
1. Commensurability with Money
Tangible harms may be viewed as especially straightforward
candidates for injury in fact on the basis that the loss of tangible
goods is commensurable with money.264 Goods commensurable with
each other are here understood as goods the value of which “can
comprehensibly be measured on a single scale.”265 Examples of goods
sometimes considered incommensurable with money include life,
friendship, beautiful features of the environment, art, education,266
264. Cf. Kaminski, supra note 17, at 415 (“Information harms are certainly not ‘concrete’
in the sense that they are tangible things one can hold in one’s hand or easily measure in
dollars.”).
265. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 46 (1993).
266. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 785-90, 803-08 (1994). For a critique of the view that these types of values are truly
incommensurable, see Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique
of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185, 1187-88 (1998). For a discussion
of commensurability with money in the context of administrative agencies’ treatment of
dignity, see Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123
YALE L.J. 1732, 1766-70 (2014).
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reputation, and emotional distress.267 As Douglas Laycock has writ-
ten, “[D]amages cannot replace a reputation once lost, or erase
emotional distress once suffered.”268 Similar intuitions underlie
judgments of incommensurability and judgments of intangibility:
that people value certain experiences and relationships in ways dif-
ferent to the ways in which people value goods bought and sold on
the marketplace, such that discussing the purchase of these in-
commensurable or intangible goods is somehow not fitting, or even
debases the value of these goods.269 The notion that intangibility is
similar to incommensurability is also reflected in a dictionary defini-
tion of “tangible” as “capable of being appraised at an actual or ap-
proximate value.”270 Because the loss of money is commonly viewed
as a real harm, the loss of goods commensurable with money might
provide a way to identify clear candidates for injury in fact.
But not all harms considered tangible in the standing context are
commensurable with money. In particular, significant aspects of
physical harm are often considered incommensurable. As the com-
mentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts has stated,
When ... the tort causes bodily harm or emotional distress, the
law cannot restore the injured person to his previous position.
The sensations caused by harm to the body or by pain or
humiliation are not in any way analogous to a pecuniary loss,
and a sum of money is not the equivalent of peace of mind.271
Even actual physical damage, independently of pain and suffering,
is plausibly considered incommensurable.272 Part of many people’s
uneasiness about creating a market for body parts stems from the
sense that body parts are too closely “bound up with one’s person-
hood”273 to be bought and sold. Offering a person the opportunity to
267. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 744
(1990).
268. Id. (footnote omitted).
269. See Sunstein, supra note 266, at 816. 
270. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, supra note 235.
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also Margaret
Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 70 (1993) (“[T]he tradi-
tional legal position on pain and suffering seems committed to incommensurability.”).
272. See Laycock, supra note 267, at 709 (“Plaintiffs cannot replace defective body parts.”).
273. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 126 (1996); see id. at 125-26 (noting,
however, that “we cannot honor our intuitions of what is required for society to respect
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cut off one’s arm in exchange for a certain sum of money similarly
raises the concern that physical integrity is not being valued in the
proper way. If tangibility is related to commensurability with
money, then physical harm may not be tangible.
It may be argued that calling physical harm incommensurable
fails to account for people’s real-world behavior.274 In the course of
everyday life, people reveal their willingness to pay certain amounts
of money to avoid physical harm—as, for example, when they pay
for safety equipment or buy cars with more advanced safety fea-
tures.275 Many people would also likely accept some amount of
money in exchange for enduring some degree of physical harm.
Moreover, juries award monetary damages for pain and suffering,
over and above medical bills.276 But if these practices weaken the
basis for incommensurability in the case of physical harm, then the
same is true for more traditionally “intangible” goods. Emotional
harm can form the basis of damages awards,277 and people are
willing to pay to avoid emotional harm;278 they might pay therapists,
or take lower-paying jobs in order to avoid a hostile work environ-
ment. The possibility that people would pay to avoid harm or that
courts would award damages in response to such harm does not
clearly separate physical harm from the realm of the intangible.
More generally, considering the concept of commensurability
highlights the difficulty of neatly categorizing harm into more solid
and more nebulous varieties. Many legal interests, even those the
infringement of which is routinely remedied with damages, are not
wholly commensurable with money. Discrimination, torts such as
assault and false imprisonment, the denial of labor protections, and
health and safety violations include an “incommensurable” compo-
personhood[ ] either by permitting sales [of body parts] or banning them”); see also Jesse Wall,
The Legal Status of Body Parts: A Framework, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 783, 800 (2011)
(“[T]he concern remains that human dignity is derogated when we make body parts commen-
surable with market values.”). 
274. See Posner, supra note 266, at 1188 (describing ways in which people actually make
trade-offs between goods that may appear incommensurable). 
275. See, e.g., Henrik Andersson, Consistency in Preferences for Road Safety: An Analysis
of Precautionary and Stated Behavior, 43 RES. TRANSP. ECON. 41, 41-42 (2013); Eric A. Posner
& Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 551 (2005).
276. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 219, § 47. 
277. Id.; see also id. § 383.
278. See Hi Po Bobo Lau et al., Quantifying the Value of Emotions Using a Willingness to
Pay Approach, 14 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 1543 (2013). 
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nent. Even economic opportunities that do not involve immediate
pecuniary detriment could have incommensurable aspects, such as
the assurance provided by owning a contractual right, or the
suspense involved in owning a financial product with uncertain
returns. The multifaceted nature of legally recognized harm poses
challenges to efforts to categorize these harms into commensurable
and incommensurable varieties, and it underscores the risk of
oversimplification involved in assuming that certain types of harm
are clear while others are “murky.”279 
Economic harm that consists of actual financial loss, or that
possesses a value reducible to such a loss, is commensurable with
money. Perhaps, then, only plaintiffs who demonstrate such harm
should merit the judgment, by that showing alone, that their harm
is concrete. The Supreme Court has not explicitly carved out finan-
cial loss as a distinctive category that can be proven “concrete” in a
different or more straightforward way, and the view that financial
loss is always harmful should not be taken for granted, as discussed
below.280 Most pertinent to the analysis of tangibility, the meaning-
fulness of tangibility as a factor in constitutional standing analysis
would be diminished if “tangible” did not include physical harm—
that is, perceptible harm to parts of the body. Such a move would
signal that the tangible/intangible distinction in constitutional
standing doctrine had assumed a technical signification substan-
tially distinct from the broader understanding of the term, and it is
unclear what value this distinction would add.
Therefore, in searching for ways to comprehend and operational-
ize the Supreme Court’s invocation of tangibility in Spokeo, there
are limits to what a focus on commensurability with money can
achieve. Further, the relationship between commensurability and
tangibility highlights ways in which apparently solid and material
forms of harm—specifically, physical harm—contain features associ-
ated with more ethereal harms related to the human psyche.
279. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2017) (referring to the concrete-
ness inquiry for intangible harm as a “somewhat murky area”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931
(2018).
280. See infra Part II.C.3.
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2. Quantifiability
This Subsection challenges another possible reason to apply a
more rigorous concreteness inquiry to intangible harm: the view
that tangible harm is quantifiable. Quantifiability is here under-
stood as the ability to assign a numerical value to the magnitude of
harm; this is not equivalent to monetization, or the assignment of
a monetary value, but rather involves the ability to capture a
concept using a numerical benchmark.281 For example, even if pain
does not have a precise monetary value, a numerical ranking could
be assigned to the intensity of pain.282
The concept of quantifiability underlies, in certain contexts, the
distinction between tangible and intangible harm. A notable exam-
ple comes from Brown v. Board of Education, in which the Supreme
Court held that racial segregation in public schooling, despite
equality in “tangible” factors, was unconstitutional.283 The “tangible”
factors mentioned in Brown and an earlier Supreme Court desegre-
gation decision, Sweatt v. Painter,284 included “buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers,”285 and “number of the
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of
the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and
similar activities.”286 These tangible factors appear to be quantifi-
able even if some of them, such as “availability of law review,”287
“opportunity for specialization,”288 and “qualifications ... of teach-
ers”289 are not commensurable with money. According to the Court,
“intangible” factors encompassed “reputation of the faculty, experi-
ence of the administration, position and influence of the alumni,
standing in the community, traditions and prestige.”290 The Court
281. On the distinction between quantification and monetization, see, for example, Cass
R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1382 (2014); see also
Bayefsky, supra note 266, at 1737 n.10.
282. But see infra note 298 and accompanying text regarding difficulties in ranking pain
in this manner.
283. 347 U.S. 483, 492, 495 (1954).
284. 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
285. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
286. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34. 
287. Id.
288. Id. at 633.
289. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
290. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
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indicated that intangible qualities are “incapable of objective
measurement,” further suggesting a connection between quantifi-
ability and tangibility.291
Courts and commentators have connected quantifiability and
tangibility in legal contexts other than equal protection,292 and a
dictionary definition of “intangible” as “of a value not precisely
measurable”293 is reminiscent of quantifiability, though also of
commensurability with money. While the Supreme Court has not
explicitly endorsed quantifiability as a factor in constitutional
standing analysis, quantifiability might be thought to support the
application of a more straightforward standing inquiry to physical
and economic harm. For instance, quantifiable harm may be viewed
as more suitable for judicial redress because there is a clear limit on
the amount of harm that needs to be remedied.294
A difficulty with this suggestion is that physical and economic
harms are not consistently quantifiable. The pain and suffering
resulting from, or constituting part of, physical harm is hard to
quantify. In fact, Stanley Ingber has written that “[p]ain and suf-
fering is essentially the prototype of a nontransferable, nonquantifi-
able injury.”295 The difficulty in quantifying pain and suffering may
291. Id. 
292. See Mote v. City of Chelsea, No. 16-11546, 2018 WL 262855, at *19 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
2, 2018) (“The Supreme Court has held that even unquantifiable and intangible harms may
qualify as injuries in fact.”); Hossfeld v. Compass Bank, No. 2:16-CV-2017-VEH, 2017 WL
5068752, at *3 n.5 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2017) (“Tangible harms are injuries that are subject to
a more objective measurement such as ‘financial, property, or physical harms.’” (quoting
Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 476 (11th Cir. 1999))); State v. Landrum, 832 P.2d
1359, 1363 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that mental anguish and pain and suffering “are
intangible in that they are not capable of being quantified with exactness”); Hsu, supra note
179, at 468 (arguing that the injury-in-fact requirement reflects a bias that “favor[s] tangible,
economic harms over less tangible, less measurable harms”); Kaminski, supra note 17, at 414
(“Courts, desperate to find something tangible, sometimes resort to looking to more measur-
able proxies for injury.”). 
293. Intangible, ENG. OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/intangible [https://perma.cc/JM2C-GA5H]. The full definition, however, is “not
constituting or represented by a physical object and of a value not precisely measurable.” Id.
294. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994) (noting that “the
specter of unpredictable and unlimited liability” underlies courts’ reluctance to recognize
emotional harm claims). 
295. Ingber, supra note 200, at 774; see also, e.g., Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324,
336 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that “pain and suffering are difficult to quantify”); Champion v.
Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 907 (6th Cir. 2004) (“One simply cannot quantify the
mental and physical pain and suffering such an experience would cause.” (quoting Bickel v.
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be viewed as a challenge in deriving a monetary equivalent, along
the lines of incommensurability. But this challenge itself reflects the
problems inherent in breaking down pain and suffering into fixed
quanta of injury.
One might argue that it is possible to rate the intensity of pain on
a numerical scale. For example, medical practitioners rate pain on
a scale of 0 to 10,296 and such ratings are used as part of medical
evaluations of Social Security disability claimants.297 First, however,
assigning a standardized number to the pain that different individ-
uals experience remains fraught with difficulty.298 Second, harm
that is apparently “intangible” can also be measured in a rough
sense. For example, emotional distress is frequently viewed as a
paradigmatic form of intangible harm.299 Nevertheless, tools have
been developed to measure the severity of various kinds of emo-
tional distress—though, as with physical pain, there are difficulties
in making standardized measurements across different individ-
uals.300 The overall point is that the possibility of quantifying
aspects of pain and suffering does not differentiate physical and
economic harm from other types of harm.
Economic loss may seem to present an easier case for quantifiabil-
ity, but this association is not so strong as initially meets the eye.
Economic loss in uncertain quantities may not be measurable at the
Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (1995))).
296. See Smith v. Hunt, 707 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2013) (Wood, J., concurring in the
judgment); Erin E. Krebs et al., Accuracy of the Pain Numeric Rating Scale as a Screening
Test in Primary Care, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1453, 1453 (2007).
297. See, e.g., Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2014) (reporting such pain
ratings); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(ii) (2012) (factors considered in assessing disability include
“[t]he location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [the claimant’s] pain or other symptoms”).
298. See, e.g., Marcel Dijkers, Comparing Quantification of Pain Severity by Verbal Rating
and Numeric Rating Scales, 33 J. SPINAL CORD MED. 232, 241 (2010) (“[Spinal cord injury]
researchers and clinicians should be aware of the limitations of the various instruments used
for operationalizing pain severity and make decisions accordingly.”). 
299. See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 294 n.4 (2012) (“If ‘actual damages’ can mean
‘tangible damages,’ then it can be construed not to include intangible harm, like mental and
emotional distress.”); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 219, § 3 (referring to “emotional security and
other intangible interests”).
300. See, e.g., Paul A. Pilkonis et al., Item Banks for Measuring Emotional Distress from
the Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System (PROMIS®): Depression,
Anxiety, and Anger, 18 ASSESSMENT 263, 263-64 (2011); Marsha L. Richins, Measuring Emo-
tions in the Consumption Experience, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 127, 127-30 (1997) (describing
ways to measure emotion and their limitations).
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outset of a lawsuit, when standing must be present.301 For example,
courts grant preliminary injunctions on the basis of findings that
plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed because the plaintiffs’ claimed
harms will not be “fully compensable by monetary damages,” and
“an injury is not fully compensable by money damages if the nature
of the plaintiff ’s loss would make the damages difficult to calcu-
late.”302 Examples of commercial cases in which “damages are hard
to measure” include those involving lost profits, breaches of coven-
ants not to compete, and misappropriation of trade secrets.303 As
Robert Rabin has written—noting, for instance, that future econ-
omic loss resulting from an injury “in an early stage of apparently
promising professional development involves highly imprecise esti-
mation of future lost earnings”—it is an “illusion” that “there is a
sharp distinction between noneconomic and economic loss on the
dimension of precision in valuation.”304 The difficulty in quantifying
certain types of economic harm highlights the variety and internal
complexity of this type of damage.
Perhaps economic harm can theoretically be quantified, even if
not at a specific point in time.305 This point should not be taken too
far, because aspects of, say, reputational and emotional harm can
theoretically be quantified in certain respects. One might ask, for
instance, how many people have been exposed to negative state-
ments or how debilitating a mental illness has been. 
But even if economic harm can theoretically be quantified with
greater precision than other types of harm, the fundamental ques-
301. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180
(2000). 
302. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 550
(6th Cir. 2007) (first quoting Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566,
578 (6th Cir. 2002); and then quoting Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir.
1992)).
303. Laycock, supra note 267, at 711-14.
304. Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for
Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 362 (2006); see also Ingber, supra note 200, at 779
(“[D]amages for lost future wages, often viewed as tangible, economic losses, are also uncer-
tain and a matter of conjecture.”).
305. In fact, it is not clear that economic harm is always quantifiable in a sense that has
practical value. The economic loss attending breach of a contract that would have entitled a
party to a stream of revenue extending in perpetuity but pegged to a fluctuating future
benchmark may not be quantifiable except from “the perspective of eternity,” which may not
be of much practical use. (The phrase “the perspective of eternity” is used in a different
context in RAWLS, supra note 195, at 587.) 
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tion is whether the quality of “theoretical quantifiability” is of legal
or normative significance. Why should the fact that harm is easier
to measure in numerical terms play any role in that harm’s treat-
ment in standing doctrine?
A harm does not become more likely to “actually exist”306 simply
because it is more easily broken down into numbers. Harms whose
magnitude can be measured only approximately, such as emotional
distress, reputational harm, and stigma, are familiar to us as genu-
ine and consequential from everyday life.307 In fact, one of Brown’s
fundamental lessons is that features of people’s experiences that are
“incapable of objective measurement”308 can play just as significant
a role in ensuring equal citizenship as the “tangible” factors. The
Spokeo Court may have gestured toward this point in explicitly
stating that intangible harm can be concrete.309 But it is also
unclear why a harm more difficult to break down into numbers
requires more validation by history or congressional judgment to
ascertain its reality.
It may be contended that quantifiability matters because quanti-
fiable harms are easier to particularize. A harm that is difficult to
quantify, such as stigmatic harm, may be more likely to be spread
among many people in a way that raises suspicions about a suit by
“ideological plaintiffs”310 instead of by individuals who have been
personally injured.311 Yet quantifiable harms can be widely spread,
as with a tax paid by every citizen. Moreover, given that Spokeo em-
phasized the distinction between particularity and concreteness,312
306. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
307. See Healy, supra note 154, at 459 (“Even the Court does not appear to deny that
stigmatic harm is real.”); see also Bayefsky, supra note 28, at 1592 (discussing the reality of
psychological harm). 
308. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 634 (1950)).
309. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
310. Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1030, 1040 (1968). 
311. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (noting that “a suit rested
upon an impermissible ‘generalized grievance,’ and was inconsistent with ‘the framework of
Article III’ because ‘the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and “common to all
members of the public.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974))).
312. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
2346 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2285
the idea that quantifiable harm is easier to particularize may not be
a suitable factor in courts’ assessments of concreteness.
Quantifiability may also be valued as a way to identify types of
claims that are easier for courts to administer, especially when
courts award monetary damages. For instance, quantifiability might
prevent “infinite liability”313 because the amount of potential
damages would be capped. As an initial response, much of the con-
troversy surrounding Spokeo involves statutes that provide for
capped statutory damage awards if a plaintiff cannot show actual
damages.314 So the amount of liability in these cases would not be
limitless, although defendants would still face the prospect of
significant liability to a class.315 More generally, federal courts have
substantial experience adjudicating cases involving harms with
components that are difficult to quantify, such as those stemming
from constitutional rights violations and discrimination. Challenges
in the quantification of harm do not stymie a court’s ability to
administer a claim. 
Another possible view is that quantifiability matters to the
standing analysis because quantifiable harms are easier to prove.
The idea is that if units of harm can be counted, then the existence
or nonexistence of the harm will be more straightforward to gauge.
First, however, the mere fact of being able to be counted does not
render harm more easily recognizable; another person’s disgust, for
instance, can sometimes be readily ascertained even if it is difficult
to put a number to the emotion. Second, even if harms that can be
counted are easier to recognize, there is a question why the ease
with which harm can be proven is relevant to courts’ assessment of
the harm’s concreteness for standing purposes. The next Subsection
takes up this issue.
3. Susceptibility to Evidentiary Proof
This Subsection challenges the view that the relative ease of
proving the existence of tangible harm justifies a smoother path to
cognizability for physical and economic harm. Spokeo’s statement
313. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819 (Cal. 1989).
314. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (statutory damages of $100 to $1000 per violation of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act); Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 8). 
315. Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 11).
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that “tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize”316 suggests
that evidentiary considerations play some role, even implicitly, in
courts’ distinctions between tangible and intangible harm. The link
between tangibility and evidentiary factors derives support from
such understandings of “tangible” as “[p]ossible to understand or
realize”317 and “[c]apable of being touched and seen.”318 If tangible
harm is easier to prove, then the validation of history and congres-
sional judgment may not be needed to ascertain tangible harm’s
reality.
Yet it is worth questioning the link between tangibility and
evidentiary proof. Nonphysical and noneconomic harms can be
proven, especially if the task is to prove the existence of harm rather
than the precise quantity of harm. For instance, while emotional
distress has often raised concerns about proof,319 it is intuitive that
people who face certain situations would undergo emotional dis-
tress. As a leading torts treatise has stated:
[I]n most cases the reality or existence of the [emotional]
distress is not in doubt. If you are seriously threatened with
future harm by a hostile group of masked men who gather
around you in a circle, the rest of us should not doubt that you
suffered fear.320
In addition, medical practitioners diagnose and treat psychiatric
illnesses involving emotional distress, and expert witnesses testify
regarding the nature and extent of plaintiffs’ emotional distress.321
316. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
317. AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG. LANGUAGE, supra note 148.
318. Tangible, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 235.
319. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 433 (1997) (suggesting
that there is a “special ‘difficult[y] for judges and juries’ in separating valid, important
[emotional harm] claims from those that are invalid or ‘trivial.’” (quoting Consol. Rail Corp.
v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994))); Betsy J. Grey, The Future of Emotional Harm, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 2605, 2608 (2015) (noting that skepticism about emotional harm tort claims
has been fueled in part by “the need to curtail fraudulent claims”).
320. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 219, § 383; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 252,
at 1678-79 (“The fraud objection to general recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress is unpersuasive for several reasons.”).
321. See Travers v. Flight Servs. & Sys., Inc., 808 F.3d 525, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[E]x-
pert testimony ... is useful but not essential to support an award of emotional distress
damages.” (omission in original) (quoting Boston Pub. Health Comm’n v. Mass. Comm’n
Against Discrimination, 854 N.E.2d 111, 117 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006))).
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Techniques are being developed to apprehend emotional trauma
through neuroimaging, such as tests that reveal increases in brain
activity associated with post-traumatic stress disorder.322 While
these methods of ascertaining emotional distress are not exact sci-
ences, they demonstrate that emotional harm can be proven.323
Loss of reputation, too, is often considered an intangible harm.324
Yet juries award actual damages for reputational harm in defama-
tion cases even if such damage cannot be precisely quantified.325
Some jurisdictions permit reputational damages to be “pre-
sumed”—that is, awarded without proof of injury—in certain types
of cases, such as those in which people are reported to have com-
mitted a serious crime or to have a “loathsome disease.”326 But this
practice does not undermine the point that reputational harm can,
in other cases, be proven in court. In particular, the difficulty of
quantifying reputational harm with specificity does not mean that
the bare existence of such harm cannot be readily ascertained. This
is a broader point: difficulties in quantifying the amount of harm to,
for example, reputation or the psyche do not prevent plaintiffs from
showing that some harm occurred.
It may be argued that tangible harm is easier to prove, even if
intangible harm can be proven. But this point is doubtful when the
relevant harm is injuria—the legal violation itself—rather than the
downstream damnum, or factual harm.327 “Proving” injury in fact in
322. Grey, supra note 319, at 2629-34; see also Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 809, 826-31 (2015); Katherine C. Hughes & Lisa M. Shin, Functional Neuroimaging
Studies of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 11 EXPERT REV. OF NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 275
(2011).
323. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 252, at 1679 (“[A]s to particular emotional harms
for particular individuals, it is today possible to utilize specialists in psychiatry and
psychology who are generally capable of ascertaining, at least to some degree, the extent of
emotional damage.”).
324. See, e.g., WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors Family Support, Inc., 628 F.3d 1032, 1044
(8th Cir. 2011); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 252, at 1689 (referring to “the intangible
predicate harm of reputational damage”).
325. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that the “actual
harm[s] inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in
the community,” and that “all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning
the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the
injury”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
326. Liberman v. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344, 347 (N.Y. 1992). The Supreme Court has,
however, imposed constitutional limits on presumed damages. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. 
327. See supra Part I.B. 
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Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,328 the free speech case that Spokeo
cited as an example of concrete intangible harm,329 would not have
involved an in-depth evidentiary determination. Rather, the Su-
preme Court in Summum appeared to assume that the plaintiffs
had standing (without explicitly discussing standing) because the
plaintiffs wanted to erect a monument in a city park and were told
that they could not.330 Similarly, a plaintiff can meet the threshold
for constitutional standing in free exercise cases by “alleg[ing] that
his or her own ‘particular religious freedoms are infringed,’”331 for
instance by claiming that a church was “barred from assembling for
religious worship on [a] [p]roperty” because the church was not
granted a zoning variance.332 These facts are not difficult to prove,
even if there are thorny questions about whether the challenged
conduct violated the Constitution. Nevertheless, the impairment of
some economic and physical interests may well be easier to prove
than the loss of certain noneconomic and nonphysical interests. This
observation should not, however, necessarily translate into a
smoother path for the cognizability of physical and economic harm. 
To elaborate, proving that a phenomenon occurred is not the same
as proving that the phenomenon was a harm. Controversy about
intangible harm as injury in fact, for example, often centers on the
recognition of small and apparently trivial “intangible” legal viola-
tions, as suggested by Spokeo’s example of an incorrect zip code333
or cases on the receipt of unwanted faxes334 or minor deviations from
statutorily required disclosures.335 In these cases, plaintiffs have
little trouble showing that a given phenomenon—for instance, the
dissemination of an incorrect zip code—occurred; the issue is
whether the phenomenon was harmful. But the same point applies
328. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
329. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
330. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 465.
331. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 292 n.25 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963)). 
332. Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc., v. Broward County, 450 F.3d
1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006).
333. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. The proposition that incorrect zip codes cause no cognizable
harm is subject to question. Employers or social acquaintances could form judgments about
people based on where they live, or mail might be sent to an incorrect address. I thank Vicki
Jackson for raising this point.
334. See supra Part I.D.
335. See, e.g., Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2017).
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to small amounts of economic or physical damage, such as the loss
of a few cents336 or a tiny scratch on the skin. Proof that these phen-
omena happened does not amount to proof that these phenomena
were harmful. (Perhaps the plaintiff was better off not having small
change weighing down her wallet.) Broadening the lens to more
weighty harms, it is not necessarily easier to show that the loss of
money or bodily damage caused genuine injury to plaintiffs than to
make this showing for some apparently intangible occurrences, such
as discriminatory comments likely to create stigma or a reduction
in the aesthetic qualities of a wilderness area that a nature lover
frequents.
The question of whether evidentiary factors justify a distinction
between tangible and intangible harm depends on the phenomenon
for which evidentiary proof is sought.337 If the phenomenon is the
occurrence of genuine harm, then the relative ease of proving econ-
omic loss or physical damage does not necessarily correlate with the
presence of injury in fact. Moreover, the interest in ensuring that
plaintiffs prove they have suffered harm does not mandate a dis-
tinctive analysis for intangible harm at the stage of the threshold
standing determination. Plaintiffs, after all, bear the burden of
showing injury in fact “with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation.”338 Plaintiffs could
thus be required to prove during the course of litigation that they
have suffered harm—by offering, say, evidence of reputational or
emotional damage.339 It may be argued that a more searching con-
creteness inquiry for intangible harm will help to weed out frivolous
claims early in the litigation,340 but this view requires an unjustified
assumption that allegations of intangible harm are more likely to be
frivolous.
336. In fact, courts are willing to credit minute economic losses as cognizable injury in fact.
See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“For standing purposes,
a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’” (citing McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961))).
337. I am grateful to Richard Fallon for making this point.
338. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
339. See, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., supra note 219, § 574 (describing “factors [that] bear on the
assessment of reputational loss”); 136 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 18 (2013) (describing
means of proving severe emotional distress).
340. Cf. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 436 (1997) (“[T]he common
law in this area does not examine the genuineness of emotional harm case by case.”).
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In fact, evidentiary considerations might not be as influential in
standing determinations as they may appear. As now-Judge William
Fletcher has argued, “If we put to one side people who lie about
their states of mind, we should concede that anyone who claims to
be injured is, in fact, injured if she can prove the allegations of her
complaint.”341 Courts are understandably reluctant to call plaintiffs
“liar[s],” in Eugene Kontorovich’s terms,342 and not only because
doing so might be unseemly. The concern in some cases in which
plaintiffs claim to have suffered intangible harm seems to be less
that plaintiffs are fraudulently inventing injuries than that the
recognition of plaintiffs’ injuries would lack a limiting principle. For
example, the Supreme Court, in deciding that plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against the
government’s transfer of land to a religious institution, acknowl-
edged that the plaintiffs were “firmly committed to the constitu-
tional principle of separation of church and State, but standing is
not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest.”343 The Court
noted that if it were to accept that these plaintiffs had suffered an
injury,
[A] principled consistency would dictate recognition of [plain-
tiffs’] standing to challenge execution of every capital sentence
on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not
impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to challenge
every affirmative-action program on the basis of a personal right
to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws,
to choose but two among as many possible examples as there are
commands in the Constitution.344
341. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 231.
342. Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1673 (2007) (“As
Judge Fletcher has written, to say that a plaintiff who feels injured does not have a cognizable
injury in fact is to call him a liar.”).
343. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982). 
344. Id. at 489 n.26; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (expressing
concern that if an “abstract stigmatic injury” based on the “grant of a tax exemption to a
racially discriminatory school” were recognized, “[a] black person in Hawaii could challenge
the grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school in Maine”); Healy, supra note
154, at 472-73 (discussing the concern about “[o]pening the [f]loodgates” in the context of the
recognition of stigmatic harm).
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The concern about the potential for unrestricted standing reflects
both an interest in maintaining the separation of powers—in the
sense that citizens’ political opposition to government actions should
not be channeled into the courts—and a reluctance to permit too
high a volume of lawsuits.345 The next Part addresses both issues,
arguing that the distinction between tangible and intangible harm,
and the concreteness requirement more broadly, are not needed to
achieve an appropriate balance between preserving the separation
of powers and conserving judicial resources, on the one hand, and
ensuring adequate access to the federal courts, on the other. The
current Section, for its part, has drawn attention to the limits of
evidentiary considerations, along with judgments of incommensura-
bility and quantifiability, in informing how harms should be cate-
gorized for the purposes of undertaking the standing inquiry.
III. BEYOND CONCRETENESS AND TANGIBILITY
Thus far, this Article has analyzed courts’ turn to the categories
of tangible and intangible harm as a way to operationalize the
Supreme Court’s renewed emphasis on the concreteness of harm in
Spokeo. The tangible/intangible distinction, this Article has argued,
is a normative rather than an empirical boundary that represents
an attempt to delineate human interests the infringement of which
clearly legitimizes the imposition of judicial remedies by the federal
courts. This distinction, however, results in contestable judgments
about citizens’ essential interests; oversimplifies economic and phys-
ical harm; and places undue weight on characteristics such as com-
mensurability with money, quantifiability, and susceptibility to
evidentiary proof, which do not function well as proxies for cogniza-
ble harm. What follows, then, for the Supreme Court’s constitutional
standing jurisprudence? In particular, what would be a better path? 
At the outset, a prominent critique of the Supreme Court’s stand-
ing jurisprudence, expressed famously by now-Judge Fletcher, is
that courts should not inquire into the presence of injury in fact, but
should instead ascertain whether a plaintiff has presented a viable
345. Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 24) (portraying Spokeo as “an act of judicial self-
defense” designed to ease the burden of “chronically overcrowded dockets and incessant
delays”).
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cause of action.346 This is a plausible response to the challenges and
inconsistencies that courts have encountered in applying the
concept of “concrete and particularized” injury—challenges and
inconsistencies that are likely to grow with the incorporation of tan-
gibility into standing analysis. Yet the injury-in-fact requirement
has persisted despite long-standing academic critique,347 and it is
worth considering why this is, and how to proceed in light of this
doctrinal entrenchment. The rest of this Part proceeds in that spirit.
A. The Standing Balance
 Constitutional standing doctrine involves, this Section indicates,
a balance between competing values, including the separation of
powers and the conservation of judicial resources, on the one hand,
and the role of the federal courts in addressing legal violations and
articulating legal principles, on the other. This Section argues that
the tangible/intangible distinction, and the requirement that injury
in fact be concrete independent of being particularized, are not
needed to promote a suitable balance among these values. Specific-
ally, the Section casts doubt on the extent to which preserving the
separation of powers supports either the tangible/intangible distinc-
tion or an independent concreteness requirement. The Section also
argues that the goal of preserving judicial resources does not justify
these features of standing doctrine.
To elaborate, the most prominent justification for standing doc-
trine in its current form is the separation of powers.348 Heather
Elliott and F. Andrew Hessick have separately catalogued various
separation of powers rationales for standing doctrine: ensuring that
courts maintain their historical role of deciding disputes between
346. See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 223; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 166-67; see also James
E. Pfander, Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493,
1503 (2017) (“Much has been said in the United States about whether to make the standing
inquiry part of an evaluation of the merits of the plaintiff ’s claim or to preserve it as a
threshold inquiry separate from the merits.”).
347. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV.
159, 161-62 (2011).
348. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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adverse parties;349 preventing courts from intruding on the lawmak-
ing and law enforcement prerogatives of Congress and the executive
branch;350 and bolstering judicial legitimacy by “establishing for the
public that courts act out of necessity to protect individual interests
instead of out of the judges’ desire to achieve particular policy
goals.”351 
The extent to which standing doctrine furthers certain separation
of powers interests has been challenged,352 and below this critique
is extended to the Supreme Court’s recent invocation of tangi-
bility.353 The point for now is that the concreteness requirement can
be cast as a way to ensure that federal courts stay within proper
bounds by exercising remedial authority to redress only “real”
harm.354 The tangibility concept ostensibly permits courts to avoid
contestable inquiries into concreteness for human interests viewed
as uncontroversially legitimate, while maintaining judicial control
over the recognition of more amorphous, and—in the eyes of some—
less significant types of harm.355
Beyond the separation of powers, another cluster of concerns to
which concreteness and tangibility respond are problems about the
management of the federal courts and the scope of judicial remedies.
Standing doctrine has been defended on the ground that it stems
the flow of lawsuits and thereby helps to conserve judicial resourc-
es,356 and the concreteness requirement strengthens the courts’
349. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 461; Fallon, supra note 27, at 1066; Hessick, supra note
36, at 684-85.
350. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 462-63; Hessick, supra note 36, at 691-93.
351. Hessick, supra note 36, at 694. For illuminating discussions of different concepts of
judicial legitimacy, see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1813-39 (2005); and Jackson, supra note 37, at 176. The term
“legitimacy” is here used largely to capture citizens’ views that the exercise of judicial power
is justified, akin to Fallon’s conception of “sociological legitimacy.” Fallon, supra, at 1795-96,
1828. As Fallon notes, sociological legitimacy, while by no means coextensive with moral
legitimacy, “is also likely to depend partly on the public’s moral views.” Id. at 1849.
352. See Elliott, supra note 17, at 485-86.
353. See infra Part III.B. 
354. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974)
(“[C]oncrete injury removes from the realm of speculation whether there is a real need to
exercise the power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the complaining
party.”).
355. See infra Part III.B. 
356. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191
(2000) (“Standing doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources
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gatekeeper role in performing this task. The treatment of certain
harms as tangible could be thought to identify suits in which the
need for judicial intervention to prevent harm is most evident, and
the application of the “intangible” label to other harms could permit
courts to decide that certain injuries are too insignificant to jump-
start the machinery of federal adjudication. Michael Morley has
written, for instance, that Spokeo is “an act of judicial self-defense”
that is “designed solely to weed out the legal detritus from federal
dockets” in order to ease the burden of “chronically overcrowded
dockets and incessant delays” and to “focus [courts’] resources on
litigants who need them most: those who have suffered concrete
injuries.”357 In this way, tangibility and concreteness can be viewed
as ways to further the separation of powers while advancing the
administrability of judicial processes. 
But the tangible/intangible distinction, when scrutinized more
closely, creates certain problems for the separation of powers. This
distinction, the Article has suggested, does not simply follow from
the nature of tangibility; rather, the line shifts based on legal con-
text and requires courts to make contestable judgments about which
kinds of harm are susceptible to, and worthy of, remediation in the
federal courts. In the aftermath of Spokeo, some courts have been
charged with gauging the likelihood that the harms Congress
sought to prevent will actually be prevented through the measures
that Congress devised, or that the harms that Congress sought to
prevent are genuine concerns.358 Standing doctrine, in this iteration,
does not function as a source of judicial constraint. Rather, it
encourages an understanding of courts’ standing determinations as
forms of judicial overreach and poses problems for judicial legiti-
macy.359
of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete
stake.”); Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The standing
rule reduces the workload of the federal judiciary”); Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 24)
(“Spokeo is designed solely to weed out the legal detritus from federal dockets.”); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal
Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 452 (1994) (“To further reduce the workload of the
federal judiciary, the Court began to maintain that justiciability was a constitutional bar-
rier.”).
357. Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 24). 
358. See supra Part I.D.
359. For discussions of the relationship between standing determinations and judicial
legitimacy, see Hessick, supra note 36, at 696-97; Jackson, supra note 37, at 176-78; and
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Legitimacy concerns also counsel against accepting one variation
of the argument for the concreteness requirement grounded in
resource constraints, namely that this requirement curbs consumer
class action lawsuits against companies for violating “procedural”
statutory requirements.360 The argument is that these suits do not
serve to redress any actual harm that plaintiffs have suffered, but
instead line the pockets of plaintiffs’ attorneys and induce defen-
dants to settle through the in terrorem effect of classwide statutory
damages and attorneys’ fees.361 From the perspective of judicial
restraint, this argument would be better addressed to Congress in
the form of a request to change the law than as a view that courts
should exclude such cases on standing grounds. As Vicki Jackson
has noted, “[J]usticiability decisions [that] sweep broadly to close
courthouse doors, and do not rest soundly on core principles,” can
“pose threats to judicial legitimacy.”362
It remains true that the concreteness requirement, and the
application of a distinctive standing analysis to intangible harm,
could help to limit the number of lawsuits. This development could
further the timely resolution of appeals and, perhaps, enhance the
depth of reasoning in judicial opinions. The “overcrowded dockets”
argument, however, should not function as a trump card.363 As an
initial matter, the possibility that dubious claims will drain judicial
resources can be alleviated through a targeted discovery process in
Nichol, supra note 17, at 331-32; see also Fletcher, supra note 17, at 233 (“[T]he ‘injury in fact’
test is a form of substantive due process.”); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 187-88 (critiquing a
“private law model of standing” as reflecting a discredited “Lochner-like conception of public
law”).
360. See Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 24).
361. See id.; see also Devin Chwastyk, NcNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, Post-‘Spokeo’ Stand-
ing for Consumer Class Actions a Struggle, JD SUPRA (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.jd.supra.
com/legalnews/post-spokeo-standing-for-consumer-class-86381 [https://perma.cc/ V7E8-VSHY]
(“[W]hether federal plaintiffs need only allege a bare violation of a consumer protection
statute ... is particularly relevant in consumer protection class actions, where the award of
even modest statutory damages to a putative class, together with attorney’s fees, creates
strong incentives for defendants to settle.”).
362. Jackson, supra note 37, at 177.
363. See Healy, supra note 154, at 473 (arguing that the possibility of frivolous lawsuits
should not deter courts from recognizing stigmatic harm as injury in fact). For a nuanced yet
skeptical evaluation of certain arguments based on the “floodgates of litigation,” see Marin
K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1056-73 (2013); see also
Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 377, 396-405 (2003). 
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particular cases,364 or more general discovery reforms,365 instead of
raising the cognizability threshold for a variety of disparate types
of claims.
More fundamentally, courts do not have sole authority over the
allocation of judicial resources. Congress is entitled to take action
that increases the amount of litigation in federal courts; Congress
may, for instance, create new causes of action that spawn litiga-
tion.366 The judgment that increased delay in the adjudication of
cases, or a reduced amount of time spent on each case, or simply a
higher judicial workload, is the price to pay for increased access to
the courts, is one that Congress can at least participate in mak-
ing367—perhaps short of a caseload that makes it impossible for the
judiciary to function and thus raises questions about the separation
of powers.368 In statutory cases, at least, courts are not the only
bodies authorized to weigh considerations of judicial efficiency
against increased access to the courts.
The broader point is that decisions about where to allocate
resources may be administrative or managerial, but they are not
merely technocratic. Rather, courts make choices to alleviate admin-
istrative problems by limiting access for those alleging certain types
of harm. “Practical” concerns, in other words, are also normative
ones, because decisions not to adjudicate certain types of suits have
costs.
One such cost involves access to legal redress in the federal courts
for those whose harms are judged to be insufficiently real. It may be
364. See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A
district court has broad latitude to determine the scope of discovery and to manage the
discovery process.” (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir.
2006))), aff’d sub nom. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
365. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Propor-
tionality in Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2016); see also Levy, supra note 363, at 1070-
71 (detailing procedural steps that courts could take to streamline litigation). 
366. See JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FED. JUDICIARY CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 30 (1993) (“Legislation that creates new causes of
action or provides new remedies for existing causes of action generates appeals because it
generates more district court litigation.”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 374, 396 (1982) (“Congress has created and the courts have articulated a multitude of
new rights and legally cognizable wrongs.”).
367. See Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 741
(2009); Wu, supra note 17, at 458-59.
368. See Levy, supra note 363, at 1066; Stern, supra note 363, at 411. 
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argued that this cost is not genuine because claims by these
plaintiffs are insubstantial,369 but the issue is whether courts are
well equipped to make this determination. Restrictive standing
requirements might also decrease the deterrent power of consumer
class action lawsuits challenging, say, companies’ failure to follow
reasonable procedures to protect personal information,370 thereby
imposing costs, including economic costs, on individuals harmed in
the future by the absence of adequate protection.
A more institutionally oriented cost of stringent standing require-
ments is a reduction in the federal courts’ role in articulating legal
principles and advancing legal compliance, above and beyond the
courts’ role in resolving individual disputes.371 Courts, after all, “de-
scribe the law as it applies to all” even as they issue rulings on the
specific disputes before them.372 Some might doubt that courts can
legitimately exercise such a function outside the context of resolving
individual disputes,373 but—as the next Section argues—moving
beyond tangibility and concreteness does not mean abandoning the
concept of particularized harm. 
The overall point is that constitutional standing doctrine properly
mediates between multiple, sometimes competing principles. The
separation of powers is one such principle, but the concreteness and
tangibility inquiries license their own forms of judicial overreach.
Moreover, resource constraints are one factor in the balance, and
not necessarily an overriding one. With this conceptual framework
in mind, this Article turns to implications for the future shape of
standing doctrine.
369. See Morley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 24).
370. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing? 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-40, 2017), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3020282 [https://perma.cc/R3ET-9KEM]. For critical
discussion of the deterrence rationale for class actions, see Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class
Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 420-21
(2014).
371. For discussion of the conception of the federal courts as engaged in “law declaration”
in addition to “dispute resolution,” see Pushaw, supra note 356, at 458-59; see also Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). 
372. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 512 (2009).
373. For discussion of the view that the resolution of individual disputes is critical to the
judicial function, see Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1223-36
(2011); see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
382-87 (1978).
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B. Injury Without Tangibility or Concreteness
This Article’s most immediate suggestion is that courts should
cease distinguishing between tangible and intangible harm in ana-
lyzing whether harm is concrete. This point is based on the complex-
ities of defining tangibility and the potential for courts deploying the
idea of tangibility to make problematic normative assumptions
about citizens’ legitimate interests. Avoiding the tangible/intangible
distinction would not involve revision of long-standing doctrine, as
the Court only recently in Spokeo conceptualized intangible harm
as a form of potentially concrete harm that is proven in a distinctive
way.374 The suggestion not to consider tangibility is theoretically
compatible with dividing types of harm in another manner for the
purposes of analyzing whether harm is concrete; the point is that
any lines drawn should not be based on tangibility.
Yet the critique of tangibility’s invocation in standing doctrine
also points the way to a broader challenge to the practice of cate-
gorizing harm in order to determine if harm is real. Courts, instead
of subjecting certain types of harm to differential treatment in the
concreteness analysis, could, as noted above, require plaintiffs to
prove that they had suffered harm of whatever kind through the
ordinary fact-finding processes of litigation.375 If a plaintiff alleged,
say, reputational harm or emotional harm, then the plaintiff would
need to establish that the harm had occurred. Neither history nor
the judgment of Congress, on this account, would be needed in order
to establish that certain types of harm are suitable for redress in the
federal courts.
This approach may raise the concern that restrictions on standing
would be undermined because plaintiffs could always establish some
amount of intangible harm.376 But aspects of the standing inquiry
374. See supra Part I.C.
375. See supra Part I.C. Courts could also abolish the distinction between tangible and
intangible harm by subjecting all types of harm to the test of whether they had been
sufficiently recognized by history or the judgment of Congress. Yet this approach would
exacerbate the potential for the arbitrary and contestable exercise of judicial discretion in
defining harm by extending these inquiries into the realm of tangible harm.
376. See Richard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of
Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 977 (2008) (“Virtually any plaintiff motivated enough to sue
could plausibly claim that they were doing so to challenge some act or omission that upset
them.”).
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other than concreteness could still serve a constraining role.
Notably, the idea that injury in fact must be particularized provides
a way for courts to limit the circle of potential plaintiffs without
delving into contestable inquiries into the reality of plaintiffs’
harms.377 Courts could inquire into whether a plaintiff ’s alleged
injury “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”378
and is distinct from one “shared with ‘all members of the public’”379
without taking the additional step of determining whether the
plaintiff ’s alleged injury rises to the level of “real” harm. This
approach would involve rolling back the Supreme Court’s emphasis
on the conceptual independence of concreteness and particularity in
Spokeo, but the Court has not consistently focused on the independ-
ence of these factors.380
The following example can illuminate the use of particularity to
advance significant purposes of standing doctrine without necessi-
tating an inquiry into the concreteness of harm. Take a lawsuit
against a consumer reporting agency for failing to disclose statutori-
ly required information on an individual’s credit report; the plaintiff
does not claim that he or she lost money or access to a specific job
opportunity.381 This dispute is particularized in the sense that the
credit report in question concerns a specific plaintiff,382 but courts
might consider this type of harm to be intangible and question
whether the debtor suffered a concrete harm.383
377. It may be argued that every individual could claim to have suffered some kind of
intangible harm, such as psychological harm; therefore, the concreteness requirement is
necessary to preserve the possibility of enforcing the particularity requirement. I have argued
elsewhere, however, that courts could distinguish between cognizable and noncognizable
psychological harm by inquiring into the closeness of the connection between a plaintiff and
the legal violation that gave rise to the alleged harm. See Bayefsky, supra note 28, at 1602-04.
378. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992).
379. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Lévitt, 302
U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)).
380. See supra Part I.C.
381. See Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 340, 347 (4th Cir. 2017), in
which the consumer reporting agency allegedly “list[ed] a defunct credit card company, rather
than the name of its servicer,” on a credit report, and the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff
lacked standing.
382. See Wu, supra note 17, at 458 (“Almost invariably, privacy plaintiffs are specific
individuals who claim that their own personal information has been mishandled in some
way.”). Wu argues, more broadly, that separation-of-powers concerns are “largely absent in
the privacy cases in which standing has become a particularly high hurdle.” Id. at 457. 
383. See Dreher, 856 F.3d at 345-46.
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Turning to the separation of powers rationales for standing doc-
trine, this dispute is between adverse parties384: the recipient of the
credit report and the reporting agency. The court’s judgment will
not be an advisory opinion;385 it will have a legally binding effect,
perhaps leading to a statutory damages award. It may be argued
that this plaintiff lacks the “personal stake” required to enable him
or her “to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse
consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his
grievance,”386 because the plaintiff has suffered no real adverse
consequences. But the absence of more severe consequences does not
hamper the court’s capacity to resolve the question of whether the
consumer reporting agency violated the law, and to resolve this
question in a manner that usefully illuminates the nature of
mandated disclosures for future litigants.
Separation of powers rationales for standing doctrine also appeal
to the executive branch’s distinctive enforcement role and the inter-
est in preventing judicial encroachment on this role.387 When Con-
gress permits the subjects of credit reports to sue for companies’
failures to make mandated disclosures, Congress grants private
plaintiffs a role in legal enforcement instead of leaving this task in
the hands of the executive branch. Yet certain concerns about the ef-
fects of private enforcement on executive power have less purchase
when harm is particularized, for it is not the case that anyone could
challenge conduct taking place in an unrelated context or location.388
For example, those who were not the subjects of a credit report with
inaccurate information could not sue to force reporting agencies to
obey the law.
It may be argued that suits against credit reporting companies
pose less of a threat to the executive’s enforcement role regardless
of whether harm is particularized, because these suits target private
parties instead of the government.389 The plaintiffs in these suits
384. For discussions of the importance of adversity in standing doctrine, see Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); and Elliott, supra note 17, at 469-70.
385. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968); see also id. at 95 (“[When] no justiciable
controversy is presented ... the parties are asking for an advisory opinion.” (footnote omitted)).
386. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974).
387. See supra Part I.A.
388. For an articulation of this concern by the Supreme Court, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 756 (1984).
389. See Hessick, supra note 36, at 703 (“The concern that the judiciary might usurp the
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therefore seek to enforce a private right owed by one private party
to another, as distinct from a public right owed by the government
to the citizenry at large.390 Separation of powers concerns may in-
deed be heightened when a lawsuit seeks government enforcement
of a public right.391 But even if the identity of the defendant plays a
role in alleviating separation of powers concerns, particularity does
as well. If anyone could challenge inadequate disclosures on a credit
report about any individual, then concerns about the displacement
of executive enforcement discretion would be heightened. Moreover,
particularity can play a role in suits to enforce public rights; it could
limit suits against government agencies to, say, beneficiaries of a
specific government program or recipients of inadequate disclosures
on certain government communications. Consequently, particularity
can play a role in reducing separation of powers concerns about
moving away from an independent concreteness requirement.
Another justification for standing doctrine based in the proper
role of different branches of government is that standing prevents,
as Tara Grove has argued, the improper delegation of the execu-
tive’s broad enforcement discretion to private parties.392 This con-
cern should be lessened when harm is particularized, because then
the “pool of potential prosecutors” has “limits.”393 Moreover, because
defendants would need to be connected to a particular harmful act,
private parties would not have unbounded discretion to select de-
fendants.394 
Judicial power might still be more constrained under an approach
that applies heightened scrutiny to intangible harm in the concrete-
ness inquiry. But with the added constraint on judicial power would
come, this Article has argued, an increased degree of questionable
normative judgments about the reality of harm. To the extent that
constitutional standing doctrine represents a balance among dif-
ferent interests, the interest in promoting the separation of powers
power of the political branches also does not support imposing standing in private suits
seeking to enforce private rights.”).
390. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the distinction between public rights and
private rights.
391. See Hessick, supra note 36, at 703-09.
392. See Grove, supra note 36, at 809-10. 
393. Id. at 809.
394. Id. at 810-12.
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can be substantially furthered by an approach that eschews a focus
on concreteness independent of particularity.
A similar point applies to the interest in conserving judicial
resources. The particularity requirement reduces the number of
potential plaintiffs and thereby helps to conserve judicial resources,
even if to a lesser extent than a more complex inquiry into whether
intangible harm is concrete. The particularity requirement, in the
absence of an independent concreteness requirement, thus helps to
strike a balance between various competing aspects of standing
doctrine.
The idea of particularity should not be treated as a black box; it
is itself subject to different interpretations. The next Section disag-
gregates the concept of particularity, highlighting advantages and
drawbacks of various understandings. It contends that particularity
can plausibly be understood, in statutory cases, in terms of whether
the statutory provision under which a plaintiff is suing defines the
scope of potential plaintiffs with sufficient specificity.
C. Conceptions of Particularity
A common and intuitive understanding of particularity focuses on
the number of potential plaintiffs who could bring claims if a certain
type of injury were cognizable. According to this view, an injury is
particularized if there is a “particular individual or class”395 that has
been affected by the challenged conduct differently from other
“members of the public.”396 A vision of particularity centered on the
size of the potential plaintiff class implicitly underlies a certain
separation-of-powers rationale for the particularity requirement.
This argument is that the legislative and executive branches have
a comparative advantage over the judiciary in responding to the
grievances of large numbers of citizens.397
Yet the Supreme Court has not defined particularity purely as a
matter of numbers. The issue of whether “the asserted harm is a
‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens”398 depends not only on how many people
395. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
396. Id. at 178 (quoting Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) (per curiam)). 
397. See supra Part I.A.
398. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
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share the harm, but also on the ways in which citizens are influenc-
ed by the harm—whether each citizen is “affect[ed] ... in a personal
and individual way.”399 As Justice Scalia stated in a dissent, a mass
tort (which affects many people) could inflict “a particularized and
differentiated harm. One tort victim suffers a burnt leg, another a
burnt arm—or even if both suffer burnt arms they are different
arms.”400 
Particularity understood in terms of whether a plaintiff is distinc-
tively affected by an injury can advance the separation of powers
and help to conserve judicial resources even in the absence of an
independent concreteness requirement. Limiting standing to those
distinctively affected by an inadequate disclosure on a credit report
would, for the reasons discussed above, constrain federal jurisdic-
tion.401 Moreover, there is likely overlap between cases in which the
number of potential plaintiffs is relatively contained and cases in
which certain citizens are distinctively affected, so the intuition that
a large number of plaintiffs correlates with noncognizable harm
would maintain some force.
Nevertheless, conceiving of particularity in terms of whether a
class of individuals has been distinctively affected creates difficul-
ties of its own. First, this conception stands in tension with certain
aspects of standing doctrine. Federal courts have, for instance,
adjudicated cases in which plaintiffs claim that they have been
improperly denied access to information even though numerous
citizens are affected in the same way.402 Second, if injury in fact
involves “factual” harm,403 then it is not clear why one person is less
likely to have actually been injured simply because many others
share that injury. A third challenge involves line-drawing; how
many people need to be able to sue based on the same harm before
that harm is no longer adequately particularized? 
399. Lujan v. Defs, of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992); see also Spokeo v. Robins, 136
S. Ct. 1540, 1548 n.7 (“The fact that an injury may be suffered by a large number of people
does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance.”). 
400. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 35 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
401. See supra Part III.B.
402. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25 (lack of access to information relevant to voting); Pub.
Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (denial of a request under the
Freedom of Information Act); see also Kreimer, supra note 17, at 753-54, 766. I am grateful
to Richard Fallon for discussion of this point.
403. See supra Part I.C.
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These objections are not necessarily fatal to the idea of particular-
ity understood in terms of whether a certain class of plaintiffs has
suffered a distinctive injury. First, courts could acknowledge that
some types of injuries, such as denials of access to information
relevant to voting, are especially difficult to particularize, without
disturbing the particularity requirement for a wider class of claims.
Such an approach would require a more context-specific view of the
standing inquiry than courts have explicitly adopted.404 But stand-
ing doctrine is already frequently criticized for inconsistency,405 and
this revision might provide a way to acknowledge the existence of
different doctrinal strains more clearly. Alternatively, courts could
limit standing to sue for lack of access to information to certain
plaintiffs who are more likely to be especially harmed by the ab-
sence of a given type of information—for example, those whose
professional activities are affected by the lack of access.406
Second, with respect to the point about factual harm, it is true
that plaintiffs may be genuinely harmed even if many other
individuals are harmed alongside them. But courts could still seek
to identify plaintiffs who actually possess a heightened interest in
the resolution of a legal question,407 such as those who received un-
wanted telephone calls or faxes.408 Moreover, the question of wheth-
er particularized harm is more likely to have actually occurred
affects all accounts of standing that include a particularity compo-
nent, including existing standing doctrine. The appropriate response
may be to deny that the inquiry into cognizable injury is a factual
one.409
404. See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1107 (arguing that courts should acknowledge “that what
counts as an injury depends on the provision under which a plaintiff brings suit”).
405. See sources cited supra note 17.
406. See, e.g., Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449 (“[The plaintiffs] seek access to the ABA
Committee’s meetings and records in order to monitor its workings and participate more
effectively in the judicial selection process.”). 
407. This approach bears a similarity to the “relative standing” inquiry endorsed by
Richard Re. See Re, supra note 64, at 1214 (“[R]elative standing authorizes suits by plaintiffs
who have the most at stake in obtaining a particular remedy.”).
408. See, e.g., Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding
standing for an alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) as a
consequence of an unwanted call); Compressor Eng’g Corp. v. Thomas, 319 F.R.D. 511, 524
(E.D. Mich. 2016) (finding standing for an alleged violation of the TCPA as a result of the
plaintiff ’s “occupied” fax machine or telephone line).
409. See Fletcher, supra note 17.
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The third point involves the problem of where to draw the line in
delineating “particularized” harm. The number of plaintiffs distinc-
tively affected by an injury varies based on the nature of the injury,
and courts likely cannot identify a specific number of plaintiffs that
is too high for cognizability. But courts can still identify, as just
noted, the characteristics of a class of distinctively affected plain-
tiffs.410 Nevertheless, the task of identifying plaintiffs most affected
by a legal violation may well be a challenging one with multiple
plausible responses. It is therefore worth exploring other concep-
tions of particularity.
On one promising alternative, courts could conceive of particular-
ity as a matter of the specificity with which the circle of potential
plaintiffs is defined by the substantive legal provision under which
a plaintiff is suing. In statutory cases like Spokeo, courts could in-
quire into whether the statute clearly identifies the circle of poten-
tial plaintiffs and whether a given plaintiff falls within this circle. 
Indeed, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Spokeo may have moved
partially in this direction.411 Justice Thomas, drawing on historical
common law practice, differentiated between private rights that
belonged to particular individuals and public rights involving duties
owed to the community at large.412 He stated that “the concrete-
harm requirement does not apply as rigorously when a private
plaintiff seeks to vindicate his own private rights,” and that the
Court’s “contemporary decisions have not required a plaintiff to
assert an actual injury beyond the violation of his personal legal
rights to satisfy the ‘injury-in-fact’ requirement.”413 By contrast, for
public rights—say, a suit brought by a plaintiff to require a govern-
ment agency to follow certain procedures—“the plaintiff must allege
that he has suffered a ‘concrete’ injury particular to himself.”414
One way to understand private rights cases is that the injury in
these cases, which is simply the violation of a legal right belonging
to an individual, is necessarily particularized and thus does not
410. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
411. For illuminating discussion of this concurrence, see Baude, supra note 28, at 227-31. 
412. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
413. Id. at 1552 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 226 (1978)).
414. Id. (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-23
(1974)).
2018] CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY AND TANGIBILITY 2367
need to be concrete.415 The question, then, is when a statutory
provision should be considered sufficiently particularized. As Will
Baude has noted,416 Justice Thomas’s concurrence indicated that
Congress may be able to particularize harm by “creat[ing] a private
duty owed personally to” a plaintiff “to protect his information.”417
Justice Thomas suggested that this condition might be satisfied by
the statutory requirement that Spokeo “follow reasonable proce-
dures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”418 Justice
Thomas supported a remand to the Ninth Circuit to consider wheth-
er this legal provision had created a private right.419 
Building on this suggestion, courts undertaking the injury-in-fact
inquiry could consider whether the provision under which a plaintiff
is suing specifically identifies the individuals who would suffer
harm if the provision were violated, as well as whether the plaintiff
is one of those individuals—in Spokeo, the person to “whom the
report relates.” In this way, courts would assign responsibility to the
institution that made the law under which an individual is suing to
define the scope of potential plaintiffs; courts would not inquire into
whether those plaintiffs have suffered “real” harm. This suggestion
is related to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s statement, in his concur-
rence in Lujan, that Congress can “define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before,” as long as Congress takes care to “identify the
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit.”420 Particularity can be gauged with
reference to whether the class of plaintiffs is specifically enumer-
ated in the legal provision under which a plaintiff is suing.
The question remains, however, whether federal courts can
enforce Article III limitations on Congress’s ability to authorize suit
415. See Baude, supra note 28, at 231 (noting that Justice Thomas’s concurrence might be
read to state that “any legal duty may be said to create a private right so long as it is
adequately personalized”); Hessick, supra note 36, at 708 (“[A]ny threatened violation of a
private right is particularized.”).
416. See Baude, supra note 28, at 231.
417. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Thomas, J., concurring).
418. Id. at 1553-54 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012)).
419. Id.
420. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (majority opinion).
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by private plaintiffs. If Congress specifically indicated that every
citizen had a personal right to visit a certain wilderness area, could
courts nevertheless determine that some plaintiffs had suffered no
injury entitling them to challenge the area’s destruction? The most
plausible response is that courts could not restrict injury in fact in
such a case, because Congress had clearly delineated the class of
potential plaintiffs, which, in this case, included every citizen. On
this account, Congress would be assigned the ultimate task of defin-
ing the contours of standing doctrine.421 
The notion that Congress is not constrained in its ability to
particularize harm would bring the standing inquiry close to Judge
Fletcher’s view that courts should examine whether a plaintiff has
a cause of action rather than whether a plaintiff has alleged harm
in a prelegal sense.422 Yet Congress, in addition to creating a cause
of action, would still be required to define the scope of suitable
plaintiffs. 
To the extent that this approach raises concerns about too sig-
nificantly undermining limitations on standing, the inquiry might
acquire greater constraining force if it were construed as a clear
statement rule for Congress. On this account, a statute should not
be interpreted to grant standing to any given plaintiff unless Con-
gress has clearly stated as much.423 Alternatively, and less restric-
tively, courts could use such a clear statement rule to control only
the outer bounds of Congress’s ability to grant standing: a statute
should not be interpreted to grant standing to the citizenry at large
without a clear statement of this goal.
The basic effect of such a clear statement rule would be to “im-
pose[ ] a judicial tax on legislation”424 that, in lifting constraints on
injury in fact, might have an adverse impact on the separation of
421. Cf. John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of Con-
stitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (2014) (suggesting that “[t]he Necessary and
Proper Clause delegates power to Congress to fill up the details” about various governmental
functions and powers, including standing).
422. See supra note 346 and accompanying text; see also Sunstein, supra note 17, at 188-89.
423. For discussions of the nature of clear statement rules, see, for example, William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992); John F. Manning, Clear
Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 407 (2010); and David L.
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 940-41
(1992).
424. Manning, supra note 423, at 425.
2018] CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY AND TANGIBILITY 2369
powers or on the conservation of judicial resources. Such a “tax”
could help to advance these values without necessarily suggesting
that Congress is constitutionally barred from creating standing
when it clearly identifies the circle of plaintiffs entitled to sue.
While such an approach might be criticized as a “backdoor” form of
“constitutional lawmaking,”425 it responds to the difficulty of accom-
modating concerns about the separation of powers and resource
constraints without endorsing problematic judicial inquiries into
whether harm is real.
This Part has provided several ways to respond to the challenges
of categorizing harm in a way that is sensitive to the principles
underlying the development of constitutional standing doctrine.
Courts could eliminate the tangible/intangible distinction while
continuing to inquire into concreteness; they could cease inquiring
into concreteness defined independently of particularity and use the
scope of potential plaintiffs as a factor in limiting standing; and they
could conceptualize particularity in statutory cases in terms of the
specificity with which the scope of plaintiffs is defined in the rele-
vant legal provision. These options are different in substance and
would require varying levels of revision to existing standing doc-
trine. But they all respond to the challenge of defining harm in a
way that advances judicial legitimacy and avoids reliance on con-
testable conceptions of harm and citizens’ interests—a challenge
exacerbated by the distinction between tangible and intangible
harm. At a minimum, the analysis here suggests, courts appealing
to any distinction between tangible and intangible harm should
explain the understanding of “tangible” that is being employed and
justify the view that intangible harm ought to be subject to a dis-
tinctive standing inquiry. 
CONCLUSION
This Article has provided an in-depth look at concepts that have
recently assumed a more influential role in standing doctrine: the
ideas of tangibility and concreteness. The distinction between
“tangible” and “intangible” harm, the Article has argued, is not a
clear-cut feature of objective reality, but a contextually dependent
425. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 423, at 636. 
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boundary that implicates normative views about which kinds of
harm count for standing purposes. More generally, the inquiry into
whether harm is concrete invites courts to make contestable judg-
ments that could override congressional determinations in a way
that risks undermining the legitimacy of judicial standing decisions.
The Article has proposed that courts cease invoking the tang-
ible/intangible distinction in standing analysis and, more broadly,
move away from the Supreme Court’s recent emphasis on the
concreteness of harm independent of whether harm is adequately
particularized. Particularity, in turn, can be conceptualized in
multiple ways, and a plausible approach in statutory cases is to
focus on the specificity with which the circle of potential plaintiffs
is defined by the legal provision under which a plaintiff is suing.
These revisions would enable courts to strike a more suitable
balance between concerns about the separation of powers and
resource constraints that help to support standing doctrine, on the
one hand, and the values of promoting judicial legitimacy and
enabling access to legal redress in the federal courts, on the other.
